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Catch Me if You Can:
An Analysis of New
Enforcement Measures and
Proposed Legislation to Combat
the Sale of Counterfeit Products
on the Internet
Jeffrey A. Lindenbaum* and David Ewen**
I.

Introduction

Like many things, the world of counterfeiting was forever
changed by the Internet. The virtually impenetrable shield of
online anonymity has created an environment where, for the
first time, counterfeiters publicly and brazenly advertise, with
impunity, that their products are indeed counterfeit. Rather
than focusing on a calculable number of counterfeiters in a
finite number of well-known and high-trafficked urban centers
(e.g., New York City’s Chinatown district), brand owners are
now faced with counterfeit websites that number in the
thousands and change on a daily, and in some instances
hourly, basis. Moreover, because a counterfeiter can, with
minimal effort and little financial hardship, quickly replace one
disabled website with a new one, the traditional enforcement
measures have proven ineffective and cost-prohibitive.
The overwhelming volume of counterfeit activity has left
the government and brand owners to explore creative measures
to attack this problem from new directions. For most it is
simply not practical or economically feasible to address
counterfeit websites one at a time. Instead, brand owners must
seek solutions whereby a single enforcement effort disrupts
multiple counterfeit websites.
This Article will discuss two different approaches presently
being employed by brand owners to combat this problem. The
first involves commencing a single lawsuit against hundreds of
567
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unidentified owners of counterfeit websites. Because of the
difficulty with obtaining accurate contact information for the
owners of these websites, courts in several jurisdictions have
permitted deviations from the traditional methods of service,
allowing a plaintiff to effectuate service through, for example,
email and online postings. Because the products on these
websites are obviously (and in many instances admittedly)
counterfeit, courts have seemingly relaxed earlier practices
which mandated a physical inspection of the alleged counterfeit
products. Likewise, courts have provided injunctive relief
directed towards third parties and have required very little, in
terms of the posting of a bond to protect the defendants against
an unlawful seizure.
The second approach involves using payment processing
companies, such as credit card associations, to exercise
leverage over their international banking customers to
terminate the counterfeiter’s bank accounts. These efforts do
not focus on disabling a particular counterfeit website, but
rather on disrupting the flow of funds to the counterfeit
merchant’s account. Brand owners hope that, by disabling a
merchant’s account, they can interrupt the flow of funds to
multiple counterfeit websites operated by the same merchant.
The Article will highlight the incentives for the credit card
associations’ cooperation, including protection of their own
brands as well as avoiding risks of contributory liability, and
persuading Congress that stricter laws and oversight are
unnecessary.
Finally, the Article will analyze recent anti-counterfeiting
legislation such as the proposed Stop Online Piracy Act and the
Protect IP Act, as well as their predecessor, COICA, and opine
whether, and how, these types of bills could assist brand
owners with the two types of enforcement efforts outlined
above. It will also comment on the strongly voiced objections to
the legislation lodged by several online business owners and
interest groups.
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II. The Mass Domain Lawsuit
A search for the phrase “replica rolex watch” on the Google
search engine produces 14,200,000 results.1 Not surprisingly,
the first page of these search results provides links to several
websites offering counterfeit Rolex watches. Remarkably, nine
pages into the search results, there are just as many
counterfeit websites—many appearing to be original and
unaffiliated with the results found on the earlier search engine
result pages. The same is true for the results found at pages
seventeen, twenty-nine, and continuing on through the Google
results. Commencing a lawsuit to remove just one of these
counterfeit websites would be an exercise in futility. This is
what many describe as the unending game of “whack-a-mole:”
as soon as one website is challenged, several more pop up in its
place. Brand owners cannot justify the costs and time needed to
prosecute an infringement lawsuit, simply to achieve a default
judgment against a single defendant, who will never be
identified, never satisfy any monetary judgment, and who will
replace his counterfeit website with an entirely new site before
the ink is even dry on the complaint.
Seeking a creative alternative, several brand owners have
pursued another option. Rather than commence a lawsuit
against a single defendant (or a single website), brand owners
have commenced what this Article refers to as a “mass domain
lawsuit.” In these lawsuits, the brand owners join, in one
action, as many as five hundred or more John Doe defendants,
* Jeffrey A. Lindenbaum is a partner in the New York Intellectual
Property law firm, Collen IP. Mr. Lindenbaum graduated from the University
at Buffalo School of Law. A personal thanks and dedication to my wife and
boys for all their support, inspiration and for sacrificing quality “Daddy
Time” for this Article.
** David Ewen is an associate in the IP/IT department of McCarter &
English, LLP in Hartford, Connecticut, and formerly an associate at Collen
IP. David obtained his B.A., History from Vassar College in 2004, and J.D.
from the University of Connecticut School of Law in 2009.
1. GOOGLE,
https://www.google.com/#hl=en&sclient=psyab&q=replica+rolex+watch&pbx=
1&oq=replica+rolex+watch&aq=f&aqi=g4&aql=&gs_sm=3&gs_upl=3385l399
3l3l6177l2l0l2l0l2l0l0l0ll2l0&bav=on.2,or.r_gc.r_pw.r_qf.,cf.osb&fp=e08f40f4
badaf740&biw=1366&bih=566 (last visited Feb. 26, 2012). (searching “replica
Rolex watch” in Google search).
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and target hundreds of counterfeit websites.
The response from each counterfeit defendant fully meets
expectations: each of the defendants, without making an
appearance, or revealing their identity, has defaulted.2 The
brand owners, through these lawsuits, have taken advantage of
the expedited default proceedings to quickly disable mass
quantities of counterfeit websites, and interrupt the flow of
funds to these sites. With relatively minimum investment,
brand owners can make a noticeable impact on the volume of
existing counterfeit websites, and quickly move on to the next
group of sites.
The relief obtained from these lawsuits is in many respects
consistent with traditional counterfeit lawsuits. However,
because of the special circumstances that arise from the
pursuit of large quantities of quickly-shifting, online
counterfeit websites, the courts have endorsed some remedies
not typically seen in traditional counterfeit actions. This
Section will look at six of the mass domain lawsuits that were
filed over the past two years and analyze the similarities and
differences between these actions and more traditional
counterfeit lawsuits. In the end, it will consider whether the
mass domain lawsuit is a successful tool for attacking the
“whack-a-mole” problem.
A. Recent Examples of Mass Domain Lawsuits
1. Chanel in the Western District of Tennessee
New York-based Chanel, Inc. brought the first of these
lawsuits on September 20, 2010, in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Tennessee.3 The complaint,
which was filed under seal, named five hundred John Does,
and listed 172 defendant domain names.4 Chanel, owner of the
brands CHANEL and the interlocking “CC’s” asserted claims
for trademark infringement and counterfeiting, false
2. Except for a very small number of defendants who were voluntarily
dismissed by the brand owners.
3. Complaint at 1, Chanel, Inc. v. Does 1-172, No. 2:10-cv-2684-STA-dkv
(W.D. Tenn. Sept. 20, 2010).
4. Id.
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designation of origin, cyberpiracy and unfair competition.5
The court granted Chanel’s ex parte motion for a
temporary restraining order.6 The court’s order included
injunctive relief typical for a trademark counterfeiting action,
such as enjoining defendants from manufacturing, importing,
promoting, or selling any products bearing the Chanel
trademarks, and destroying evidence related to the alleged
infringement.7 But it also granted extraordinary relief,
particularly given the very little evidentiary support for each
individual website. First, the order states:
The top-level domain (TLD) Registry for the
Subject Domain Names . . . shall change the
Registrar of record for the Subject Domain
Names to the United States based Registrar
GoDaddy.com, Inc. where they will be placed in a
holding account in trust for the Court. . . .
Additionally,
GoDaddy.com,
Inc.
shall
immediately update the Domain Name System
(“DNS”) data it maintains for the Subject
Domain Names, which links the domain names .
. . which will cause the domain names to resolve
to the website where a copy of the . . . documents
on file in this action are displayed. Alternatively,
Go Daddy.com, Inc. may institute a domain name
forwarding which will automatically redirect any
visitor to the Subject Domain Names to the
following Uniform Resource Locator (“URL”)
http://servingnotice.com/oft/ index.html whereon
a copy of the . . . file in this action shall be
displayed.8
The order was not limited to just the domain names listed
in the complaint, but also provided that should Chanel, during
the pendency of this action, discover additional infringing
domain names, these too may be added to the restraining
5. Id. at 4:10-14.
6. Order Granting Ex Parte Application for Entry of Temporary
Restraining Order at 6, Chanel, Inc. v. Does 1-172, No. 2:10-cv-2684-BBD-dkv
(W.D. Tenn. Nov. 4, 2010).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 7-8:5.
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order.9
Another distinctive element of this order was its
authorization of service via email and by posting the relevant
papers on a website:
Plaintiff shall serve a copy of the Ex Parte
Application and this Order and all other
pleadings and documents on file in this action on
Defendants by posting a copy of the Ex Parte
Application and this Order on the website
located at http://servingnotice.com/oft/index.html
within forty-eight (48) [hours] of the Subject
Domain Names being transferred to the Go
Daddy holding account and such notice shall so
given shall be deemed good and sufficient service
thereof. Plaintiff shall thereafter further provide
notice of these proceedings and copies of the
documents on file in this matter to Defendants
using all email addresses identified in the
registration data for each of the Subject Domain
Names.10
Finally, the court’s order mandated that Chanel post a
bond in the amount of twenty thousand dollars “prior to
requesting the Registries to transfer control of the Subject
Domain Names.”11 The order also directed that the file remain
sealed until the subject domain names were transferred to the
court’s control.12
Fifteen days later, the court converted the temporary
restraining order (“TRO”) into a preliminary injunction,
adopting the same provisions of the TRO, and unsealed the
court file.13 The preliminary injunction directed that Chanel’s
9. Id. at 8:8 (“This Temporary Restraining Order shall apply to the
Subject Domain Names and any other domain names properly brought to the
Court’s attention and verified by sworn affidavit to be used by Defendants for
the purpose of counterfeiting the Chanel Marks at issue in this action and/or
unfairly competing with Chanel in connection with search engine results
pages.”).
10. Id. at 9:11.
11. Id. at 8:9.
12. Id. at 10:12.
13. Order Granting Application for Preliminary Injunction, Chanel, Inc.
v. Does 1-172, No. 2:10-cv-2684-BBD-dkv (W.D. Tenn. Nov. 15, 2010).
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twenty-thousand-dollar bond be maintained.14
2. Chanel in the District of Nevada (Las Vegas)
Exactly one year after commencing its action in Tennessee,
Chanel, on September 20, 2011, brought a second lawsuit in
the United States District Court for the District of Nevada.15
The caption of this action identified the defendants as John
Does 1-1000,16 and the complaint specifically disclosed 399
defendant-domain names.17 The language of the complaint,
motion papers, and resulting temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction tracked those of the earlier-filed
Tennessee action.
3. Tiffany in the District of Nevada (Las Vegas)
On April 18, 2011, New Jersey-based Tiffany (NJ), LLC,
known for its manufacture of luxury goods, including jewelry,
brought suit in the United States District Court for the District
of Nevada.18 The defendants were identified as John Does 11000, and the pleading listed 223 defendant-domain names.19
Tiffany brought claims for trademark counterfeiting and
infringement, cyberpiracy, and unfair competition, all
pertaining to sixteen registered trademarks, most notably its
TIFFANY and TIFFANY & CO. marks.20
The relief granted by the court closely followed that
obtained by Chanel only a few months earlier in this same
court. As with Chanel, Tiffany was required to post a bond of
14. Id. at 11:9.
15. Complaint, Chanel, Inc. v. The P'ships & Unincorporated Ass’ns.
Identified on Sch. “A”, No. 2:11-cv-01508-KJD-PAL (D. Nev. Sept. 20, 2011).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Complaint, Tiffany (NJ), LLC v. The P'ships & Unincorporated
Ass’ns. Identified on Sch. “A”, No. 2:11-cv-00590-LDG-CWH (D. Nev. Apr. 18,
2011).
19. Order Granting Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Application for Entry of
Temporary Restraining Order at 10-14, Tiffany (NJ), LLC. v. The P'ships &
Unincorporated Ass’ns. Identified on Sch. “A”, No. 2:11-cv-00590-LDG-CWH
(D. Nev. May 11, 2011).
20. Id. at 2-3.
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twenty thousand dollars, and was authorized to serve the
defendants via email, and by posting the relevant court-filed
papers on http://servingnotice.com/off/index.html.21
4. Philip Morris in the Southern District of Florida
Philip Morris USA, Inc., a company organized under the
laws of, and residing in, Virginia, filed suit in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida on November
9, 2011, against defendants Zhilin Jiang, Haidong Huang,
Andy Ling a/k/a Andyling, and Does 1-10.22 The complaint
identified fifty-eight defendant-websites.23 Philip Morris
brought claims for trademark counterfeiting and infringement,
false designation of origin, and cybersquatting, relating to its
MARLBORO mark and its Marlboro packaging design mark.24
Similar to the Chanel and Tiffany matters, Philip Morris
was permitted to serve the defendants and provide notice via
email and posting a copy of the pleadings at
http://servingnotice.com/jiang/index.html.25
Philip
Morris
secured the same preliminary relief as Chanel and Tiffany,
including transfer of the subject domain names to the court’s
custody.26 Notably, the Southern District of Florida also
directed non-party Western Union27 to divert and hold all
money transfers to the named defendants, and to provide
Philip Morris with records of any money transfers that have
been paid to the named defendants. The court’s preliminary
injunction stated:

21. Id. at 8:11,13.
22. Complaint, Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Jiang, No. 1:11-cv-24049-KMM
(S.D. Fla. Nov. 9, 2011).
23. Id. at 17-18.
24. Id. at 4:9-12.
25. Order Granting Ex Parte Application for Alternate Serv. at 3, Philip
Morris USA Inc. v. Jiang, No. 1:11-cv-24049-KMM (S.D. Fla. Dec. 6, 2011).
26. Order Granting Application for Entry of Preliminary Injunction,
Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Jiang, No. 1:11-CV-24049-KMM (S.D. Fla. Dec. 12,
2011), available at http://servingnotice.com/jiang/026%20%20Order%20Granting%20PI.pdf.
27. Id. at 10 n.4 (noting that the preliminary injunction order states that
Western Union is licensed to do business in the State of Florida, and is
therefore subject to personal jurisdiction in this court).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/1

8

LINDENBAUMMACRO 65 PAGES

2012]

11/13/2012 9:07 AM

CATCH ME IF YOU CAN

575

Western Union Financial Services, Inc.
(“Western Union”) shall divert and/or continue
diverting all money transfers sent by United
States consumers to: (1) Zhilin Jiang in Putian,
China . . . (2) Haidong Huang in Putian, China . .
. and (3) Haidon Huang . . . and continue to hold
such transfers until it receives further direction
from the Court.28
Although the Philip Morris case included considerably
fewer domain names and defendants than other lawsuits
discussed in this Article, the Southern District of Florida
required a noticeably larger bond in the amount of one hundred
thousand dollars.29
5. True Religion in the Southern District of New York
California-based jeans manufacturers, True Religion
Apparel, Inc. and Guru Denim, Inc., filed suit on November 15,
2011, against forty-one defendants and identifying fifty-eight
domain names (which increased to eighty-six by the time the
temporary restraining order was executed).30 The suit alleged
claims for trademark counterfeiting and infringement,
cybersquatting, copyright infringement, unfair competition,
false designation of origin, design patent infringement, and
unlawful deceptive acts and practices,31 pertaining to the
advertising and sale of counterfeit jeans and other products.32
The Southern District of New York issued an order that
restrained not only the named defendants, but also “any
persons acting in concert or participation with them. . .
including, without limitation, Internet Service Providers
(“ISP”)” from using the True Religion trademarks and
copyrights.33 In addition to enjoining the defendants from
28. Id. at 10.
29. Id. at 11:12.
30. Complaint at 20, True Religion Apparel, Inc. v. Lei, No. 1:11-cv08242-HB (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2011).
31. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349 (2010).
32. Complaint at 21-27, True Religion Apparel, Inc. v. Lei, No. 1:11-cv08242-HB (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2011).
33. Temporary Restraining Order, Order to Disable Certain Web Sites,
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further infringing activity, the court ordered:
[A]ny third party providing services in
connection
with
any
Defendant
and/or
Defendants’
websites,
including
without
limitation, ISPs, back-end service providers,
affiliate program providers, web designers, and
sponsored search engine or ad-word providers,
shall immediately temporarily disable service to
any and all Defendants’ Infringing Web Sites.34
[A]ny third party providing services in
connection
with
any
Defendant
and/or
Defendants’ Infringing Web Sites, including
without limitation, ISPs, back-end service
providers, web designers, sponsored search
engine or ad-word providers, banks, merchant
account providers including PayPal, Inc., third
party processors and other payment processing
services, shippers, domain name registrars,
domain name registries and online third-party
selling platforms (collectively ‘Third Party
Providers’) shall within five (5) days after receipt
of such notice provide copies of all documents
and records in such person or entity’s possession
or control relating to[Defendants, their websites
and financial accounts owned by Defendants].35
Further still, the court’s order, in broad, sweeping
language, directed any entity that receives actual notice of the
order to freeze all financial accounts connected to the
defendants or their infringing websites:
[A]ny banks, savings and loan associations,
payment
processors
or
other
financial
institutions, including without limitation,
PayPal, Inc., or other merchant account
providers, payment providers, or third party
Asset Restraining Order, Expedited Discovery Order and Order to Show
Cause for Preliminary Injunction at 9-10, True Religion Apparel, Inc. v. Lei,
No. 1:11-cv-8242-HB (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2011).
34. Id. at 15.
35. Id. at 10-11.
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processors for any Defendant, any of Defendants’
operations, Defendants’ Infringing Web Sites or
for any other website owned or controlled by
Defendants, who receive actual notice of this
Order, shall immediately locate all accounts
connected to Defendants or Defendants’
Infringing Web Sites and that such accounts be
temporarily restrained and enjoined from
transferring or disposing of any money or other
of Defendants’ assets . . . .36
The court required the plaintiffs to post a bond of only ten
thousand dollars, and authorized service via email to the 137
email addresses identified in the complaint.37
6. Coach in the Eastern District of Virginia
Following closely after Chanel’s success in Tennessee,
Coach, Inc., a corporation organized under the laws of the State
of Maryland, and headquartered in New York City, filed suit on
March 25, 2011, in in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia (aptly known as the “Rocket
Docket”38).39 Unlike the other mass domain lawsuits discussed
in this Article, Coach did not bring its action against a series of
unidentified John Doe defendants. Instead, Coach commenced
an in rem action, under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d), against the
domain names themselves. Coach’s complaint was initially
against 419 defendant-domain names, and this number was
then expanded to 473 domain names upon the filing of Coach’s
amended complaint on April 1, 2011.40 The complaint included
36. Id. at 14.
37. Id. at 12.
38. This title bestowed on the Eastern District of Virginia dates back
approximately forty years, when Judge Albert V. Bryan Jr. decided cases
were being managed far too slowly, and began ruling on motions during
argument, and was said to have tried an entire case in a single afternoon. See
Jerry Markon, A Double Dose of Molasses in the Rocket Docket, WASH. POST,
Oct. 3, 2004, at C04, available at http://wp-dr.wpni.com/wpdyn/articles/A3007-2004Oct2.html.
39. Coach, Inc. v. 1941coachoutletstore.com, 1:11cv309 (JCC/JFA), 2012
WL 27918 (E.D. Va. Jan. 5, 2012).
40. Amended Complaint for In Rem Injunctive Relief, Coach, Inc. v.
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a claim for in rem injunctive relief, and asserted Coach’s
registration, for among others, its COACH mark.41
As will be discussed below in detail, this case did not follow
track with the other lawsuits discussed in this Article, because
although preliminary relief and an injunction were sought, the
matter was resolved by way of default before the request for
preliminary relief was adjudicated by the court.42 Also
noteworthy is that Magistrate Judge John F. Anderson
challenged Coach’s joinder of seemingly unrelated defendants
into a single suit, as well as Coach’s request to serve the
defendants and provide notice via electronic means.43
B. Relief Obtained in Mass Domain Lawsuits that is Consistent
with Traditional Counterfeit Actions
Much of the relief secured by the plaintiffs in these mass
domain lawsuits is quite common in actions involving sales of
counterfeit products. To obtain a temporary restraining order
and/or a preliminary injunction in an action involving
counterfeit products, federal courts look to whether: (1) the
movant has a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the
movant will suffer irreparable harm; and (3) the public interest
will be served by issuing the injunction.44
Once a brand owner demonstrates a likelihood of consumer
confusion, most courts presume that the brand owner will
suffer irreparable injury should the infringement continue.45
Moreover, removing counterfeit goods from the marketplace,
and protecting consumers from being misled as to the source of
the products they are purchasing, has been widely accepted as
1941coachoutletstore.com, No. 11CV00309, 2011 WL 2621985 (E.D. Va. Apr.
1, 2011).
41. Id. ¶ 483.
42. See Coach, Inc. v. 1941coachoutletstore.com, 1:11cv309 (JCC/JFA),
2012 WL 27918 (E.D. Va. Jan. 5, 2012).
43. See Coach, Inc. v. 1941coachoutletstore.com, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
150693 (E.D. Va. Nov. 25, 2011).
44. See Workman v. Bredesen, 486 F.3d 896, 905 (6th Cir. 2007).
45. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Amouri’s Grand Foods, Inc., 453 F.3d
377, 382 (6th Cir. 2006); Vision Sports, Inc. v. Melville Corp., 888 F.2d 609,
612 n.3 (9th Cir. 2002); Nautilus Group, Inc. v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc.,
372 F.3d 1330, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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serving the public interest.46
In each of the mass domain lawsuits, the plaintiffs easily
established: (1) ownership of the trademarks at issue (each was
supported by a federal registration); (2) the defendants had
used the marks without authorization of the plaintiff; and (3)
the defendants’ use is likely to cause confusion (the identical
mark was applied to goods intentionally designed to look like
products manufactured by the plaintiffs).
Accordingly, it comes as no surprise that the brand owners
were able to obtain a temporary restraining order without the
defendants being afforded notice and an opportunity to
respond. According to 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d), which governs civil
actions involving counterfeit marks, “the court may, upon ex
parte application, grant an order . . . for the seizure of goods
and counterfeit marks involved in such violation and the
means of making such marks, and records documenting the
manufacturer, sale, or receipt of things involved in such
violation.”47
Likewise, the ordered restraint on future manufacturing
and promoting any products bearing the counterfeit marks is
far from controversial. Mandating a hold on all documents and
information relevant to the counterfeit activity is not only
consistent with Section 1116(d), but also with the more general
principles that require a hold on discoverable information as
soon as litigation is commenced or reasonably anticipated.
Moreover, federal courts, in counterfeit actions, have also
routinely permitted a hold on any financial assets that can be
reasonably associated with the counterfeit activity.48 In many
cases this results in an order “freezing” bank accounts.
46. See Ameritech, Inc. v. Am. Info Techs. Corp., 811 F.2d 960, 964 (6th
Cir. 1987); Chanel, Inc. v. Eukuk.com, No. 2:11-cv-01508-KJD-PAL, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12904 (D. Nev. Jan. 31, 2012); Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A.
v. P'ships & Unincorporated Ass’ns, No. 2:11-cv-00738-PMP-RJJ2012, U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1481 (D. Nev. Jan. 4, 2012).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d) (West 2011). Ex parte relief is widely accepted as
a necessary means to prevent the alleged counterfeiter from concealing
evidence of its actions. See Century Home Entm’t, Inc. v. Laser Beat, Inc.,
859 F. Supp. 636, 638 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. Does, 876
F. Supp. 407, 410 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
48. See, e.g., Levi Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise Int'l Trading, Inc., 51 F.3d
982 (11th Cir. 1995); Microsoft Corp. v. U-Top Printing Corp., No. 93-16048,
1995 U.S. App LEXIS 414 (9th Cir. Jan. 9, 1995).
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In light of the broad relief which has long been accepted for
counterfeit actions, including that which is expressly
authorized under 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d), most of what appears in
the temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions
issued in these mass domain lawsuits is consistent with the
relief routinely secured in more traditional, “brick and mortar”
counterfeit lawsuits.
C. Notable Differences Between Relief in Mass Domain
Lawsuits and Traditional Counterfeit Actions
While much of the relief obtained in these mass domain
lawsuits runs parallel to that seen in more traditional
counterfeit actions, there are several notable departures.
Arguably, these departures reflect the courts’ endorsement of
brand owner’s efforts to stretch controlling laws and precedent
to overcome the latest hurdles created by the explosion of
counterfeit websites. This Section will examine five prominent
departures, namely: (1) permitting service and publication by
email and on a website; (2) joining of seemingly unrelated
defendants in a single lawsuit; (3) lowering the threshold of
evidentiary support required to establish that the accused
goods are counterfeit; (4) compelling third parties, such as
financial institutions and registrars, to take action; and (5)
setting a bond amount that represents very little security when
considered in connection with the large number of potential
defendants impacted by the court’s order.
1. Service by Email and Electronic Notice
In the mass domain lawsuits the defendants reside, almost
exclusively, outside of the United States—the vast majority
being located in China. Accordingly, service for a federal
lawsuit is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f).49
Rule 4(f) prescribes that a person not within any judicial
district of the United States may be served “by any
internationally agreed means of service that is reasonably
49. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 4(h)(2) (a foreign
corporation may be served “in any manner prescribed by Rule 4(f)”).
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calculated to give notice, such as those authorized by the
Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and
Extrajudicial Documents.”50 Service under the Hague
Convention is a lengthy and costly procedure, which often
requires translation and hand delivery of the documents.51
Typically, a defendant located in a foreign country that is a
member of the Hague Convention (e.g., China), must be served
in accordance with the Convention’s rules.52 However, because
counterfeit website owners routinely provide fictitious contact
information and addresses, the service requirements under the
Hague Convention do not apply.53 Thus, while in most
instances concealing the location of a potential defendant
makes enforcement more difficult, the website owners have
actually helped ease the burden on brand owners.
Since the Hague Convention does not apply in those
instances where the defendant has concealed its location, a
brand owner may serve the complaint in accordance with
Federal Rule 4(f), which provides, in part, that a foreign party
may be served by:
delivering a copy of the summons and of the
complaint to the individual personally; or . . .
using any form of mail that the clerk addresses
and sends to the individual and that requires a
50. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f)(1).
51. See Int'l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 105 F.R.D. 435,
450 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (citing Pain v. United Techs. Corp., 637 F.2d 775, 788
(D.D.C. 1980)) (“[A] number of courts have observed, the Hague Convention
machinery is quite slow and costly even when the foreign government agrees
to cooperate.”).
52. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f)(1).
53. Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial
Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, art. 1, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T.
361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638, available at
http://www.hcch.net/upload/conventions/txt14en.pdf (“This Convention shall
not apply where the address of the person to be served with the document is
not known.”); see China, People’s Republic of, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW,
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=states.details&sid=30 (The People’s
Republic of China became a member state of the Hague Convention in 1987);
see also Gucci Am., Inc. v. Huoqing, No. C-09-05969 JCS, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 783, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2011) (defendant “operates anonymously
via the Internet using false physical address information in order to conceal
his location and avoid liability for his unlawful conduct.”).
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signed receipt; or by other means not prohibited
by international agreement, as the court orders.54
Service by email was very rare until the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio International Interlink.55
In Rio, the Ninth Circuit granted the plaintiff’s motion under
Federal Rule 4(f)(3) to serve the foreign defendant by email.56
In permitting this deviation, the court first rejected defendant’s
argument that service by email under Rule 4(f)(3) should only
be a last resort, and that there was some hierarchy that must
be followed before a party may rely on Rule 4(f)(3).57 The court
concluded that “service of process under Rule 4(f)(3) is neither
a ‘last resort’ nor ‘extraordinary relief.’ It is merely one means
among several which enables service of process on an
international defendant.”58
In deciding whether to permit service of process by email
the court held that:
Even if facially permitted by Rule 4(f)(3), a
method of service of process must also comport
with constitutional notions of due process. To
meet this requirement, the method of service
crafted by the district court must be “reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the
action and afford them an opportunity to present
their objections.”59
The Rio court went on to find that
[t]o be sure, the Constitution does not require
any particular means of service of process, only

54. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f)(2)-(3).
55. Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1014-15 (9th
Cir. 2007); see also Kevin W. Lewis, E-Service: Ensuring the Integrity of
International E-Mail Service of Process, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 285
(2008); Ronald J. Hedges, Kenneth N. Rashbaum & Adam C. Losey,
Electronic Service of Process at Home and Abroad: Allowing Domestic
Electronic Service of Process in the Federal Courts, 4 FED. CTS. L. REV. 56
(2009).
56. Rio Properties, 284 F.3d at 1014-19.
57. Id. at 1015-16.
58. Id. at 1015 (citations omitted).
59. Id. at 1016-1017 (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust
Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)).
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that the method selected be reasonably
calculated to provide notice and an opportunity
to respond. In proper circumstances, this broad
constitutional principle unshackles the federal
courts from anachronistic methods of service and
permits them entry into the technological
renaissance.60
In Rio, the court concluded that service by email was not
only proper, but was likely the best means to reach the
defendant who “structured its business such that it could be
contacted only via its email address.”61 Since Rio, many other
federal courts have permitted service by email using Rio’s
guiding principle that service by email may be appropriate
when it proves to be a reliable method to provide the party
notice and an opportunity to respond.62
In the case of the mass domain lawsuits (including several
of those highlighted in this article), most courts have not
hesitated to permit service by email. The circumstances
presented by the mass domain lawsuits fit squarely within the
Rio framework for when service by email is proper. First, in the
vast majority of these cases, the counterfeit website owners are
located outside of the country. Second, because the website
owners provide a fictitious address, service under the Hague
convention does not apply.63 Third, in most instances the
business of the counterfeit website owners is operated
exclusively through the Internet, and email is the most reliable
means to successfully reach each defendant.64 Finally, the
courts can take comfort knowing that, at least in the cases
discussed in this article, defendants will also receive notice
when attempting to visit their own websites, since their

60. Id. at 1017 (citations omitted).
61. Id. at 1018.
62. See, e.g., Gurung v. Malhotra, No. 10 Civ. 5086 (VM), 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 136578, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2011); see also RPost Holdings, Inc.
v. Kagan, No. 2:11-cv-238-JRG, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7566, at *5 (E.D. Tex.
Jan. 23, 2012); see also Portal Live, LLC v. Choukron, No.: 11-60203-CivCohn/Seltzer, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98623, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 1, 2011).
63. Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial
Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, supra note 53, at art. 1.
64. See, e.g., Rio Properties, 284 F.3d at 1018.
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domains are re-directed to a page that posts the court file.65
One notable exception to the ease in which brand owners
have secured permission to serve the pleadings via email, has
been the Coach case brought in the Eastern District of
Virginia. On April 29, 2011, Magistrate Judge John F.
Anderson conducted a hearing in which he raised concern
about Coach’s one-size-fits-all approach to the hundreds of
defendants.66 In particular, Judge Anderson expressed doubt
that all of the postal addresses associated with the domains
were fictitious.67 Coach relied on the fact that prior to filing
suit it had sent cease and desist letters to each of the
defendants at their addresses of record, but had not received a
single response.68 Coach concluded that the addresses must be
fictitious, never addressing the possibility that some letters
were received, but simply ignored. In the end, Judge Anderson
ordered that service be provided by postal mail and email.69
The mass domain lawsuit brought by Coach in the Eastern
District of Virginia rasises another issue regarding notice to a
defendant. In that case, Coach brought an in rem action under
15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2), not against any person or entity, but
against the domain names themselves.70 As such, Coach was
also required to publish “notice of the action as the court may
direct promptly after filing the action.”71 Coach moved the
Court to permit publication via electronic means. Judge
Anderson rejected this request as well, but required as an
alternative only that Coach publish the notice once in the Legal
Times.72
65. See, e.g., Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief, Philip Morris
USA, Inc. v. Jiang, Case No. 11-CV-24049-KMM (S.D. Fla. Nov. 9, 2011),
available at http://servingnotice.com/jiang/index.html; see also Complaint for
Injunctive Relief, Tiffany (NJ), LLC v. The P'ships & Unincorporated Ass’ns.
Identified on Sch. “A”, Case No.2:11-cv-00590-LDG-GWF (D.C. Nev. Apr. 18,
2011), available at http://servingnotice.com/off/index.html (each court filing is
available to the defendants, and the public, in .pdf format).
66. Coach, Inc. v. 1941coachoutletstore.com, No. 1:11cv0309 (JCC/JFA),
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150693, at *25-26 (E.D. Va. Nov. 25, 2011).
67. Id. at *24-25 (emphasis added).
68. Id. at *31.
69. Id. at *34.
70. Id. at *2.
71. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(II)(bb) (West 2011).
72. Transcript of Hearing at 15, Coach, Inc. v. 1941couchoutletstore.com,
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Although Magistrate Anderson’s ruling is wholly
consistent with traditional methods of providing notice in this
country, one must question the practical value of publication in
the Legal Times for an operator of a counterfeit website that
resides, for example, in China. Perhaps recognizing this point,
Judge Anderson highlights that because this is an in rem
action, the notice requirement is not just for the defendant, but
for any third party who may have a claim to the property.73
However, even Judge Anderson acknowledges that this
elevates form over function, noting that “[t]his is the fiction we
deal with in an in rem case.”74
2. Joinder of Unrelated Defendants
In the mass domain lawsuits, brand owners have joined
together in a single suit as many as several hundred different
defendants. In some instances, after initially moving against
dozens of defendants, brand owners have supplemented their
pleadings by submitting several new lists of infringing
defendants.75 To date, no defendant in these mass domain
lawsuits has challenged the propriety of joining hundreds of
seemingly unrelated defendants; rather almost every defendant
has defaulted without making an appearance. The very few
defendants that may have made some form of an appearance
presumably settled with the brand owners immediately, as it
seems the parties quietly stipulated to their dismissal before
any responsive papers were filed with the courts.76
The issue of joinder, however, was raised by one court. In
the Coach case, Magistrate Anderson sua sponte challenged the
propriety of joining numerous defendants into a single suit
No. 1:11-cv-00309-JCC –JFA (E.D. Va. Apr. 29, 2011).
73. Id. at 14.
74. Id.
75. See Memorandum of Points and Auths. in Support of Plaintiff’s
Second Ex Parte Application for Entry of Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction at 18, Chanel v. The P'ships & Unincorporated
Ass’ns. Identified on Sch. “A”, No. 2:11-CV-01508-KJD-PAL (D. Nev. Nov. 9,
2011).
76. See, e.g., Complaint, Chanel, Inc. v. The P'ships & Unincorporated
Ass’ns. Identified on Sch. “A” at 9, No. 2:11-cv-01508-KJD-PAL (D. Nev. Sept.
20, 2011).
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where there was no evidence that the defendants were related
or associated with one another.77
Federal Rule 20(a)(2) states that persons may be joined in
one action as defendants if “(A) any right to relief is asserted
against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with
respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or
series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question of
law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.”78
Magistrate Anderson explained that to “satisfy the transaction
or occurrence test under Rule 20(a)(2), there must be a logical
relationship between the events giving rise to the cause of
action against each defendant.”79 Rule 20 “should be construed
in light of its purpose, ‘to promote trial convenience and
expedite the final determination of disputes, thereby
preventing multiple lawsuits.’”80
The Magistrate’s report and recommendation concluded
that, but for eleven of the asserted domain names that had a
common postal and email address, the remaining 359 domain
names asserted in this lawsuit should not have been joined in
one action and should be severed.81 He found that “the evidence
presented is insufficient to establish that Coach’s claims
against all defendant domain names are related, that they
arise from the same transaction or occurrence, or that there is
any joint action among all the defendant domain names that
warrants relief under the ACPA in a single action.”82 For 11 of
the domain names, Magistrate Anderson did find that Coach
had satisfied the requirements of Rule 20(a)(2), as it appeared
these 11 domain names were registered by the same entity, at
the same postal address and 10 of them share the same email
address.83
Following a timely submitted Objection by Coach,
Magistrate Anderson’s report and recommendation, pursuant
77. Coach, Inc. v. 1941coachoutletstore.com, No. 1:11cv0309 (JCC/JFA),
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150693, at *25-26 (E.D. Va. Nov. 25, 2011).
78. FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(2).
79. Coach, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150693, at *13 (emphasis added).
80. Id. at *14-15 (quoting Saval v. BL Ltd., 710 F.2d 1027, 1031 (4th Cir.
1983)).
81. Id. at *43-46.
82. Id. at *25.
83. Id. at *26-27.
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to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, was then reviewed de
novo by District Court Judge James C. Cacheris.84 Judge
Cacheris ultimately rejected Magistrate Anderson’s conclusion
that all but eleven of the defendant domain names must be
severed from this action.85 However, Judge Cacheris reached
this conclusion without determining whether Coach’s
allegations comply with the joinder requirements of Rule
20(a)(2).86 Instead, the court concluded that “it must disregard
any potential defects related to joinder, as they do not affect
any party’s substantial rights, and the Court’s correction of
those defects under Rule 21 would not be on just terms.”87 The
Court’s ruling was based on the fact that each of the
defendants in this action was in default: “each Domain Name
Defendant is individually subject to default. And, ‘there is no
prejudice to any defaulting defendant, whose liability may be
established upon default irrespective of the presence of any
other defendant.’”88
Taking a very practical approach, Judge Cacheris avoids
determining whether Rule 20 would preclude joinder,
recognizing that since each defendant is in default, they suffer
no prejudice by having the default entered against them jointly
along with hundreds of other unrelated defendants. Practically,
the very real prejudice suffered by each defendant is that, but
for being able to join hundreds of defendants into a single
lawsuit, Coach would almost certainly not have expended the
resources to sue each defendant separately. In other words
each defendant was likely sued only because joining several
hundred defendants in a single lawsuit made it possible (and
not cost-prohibitive) to commence the action. This is not likely
the type of prejudice a Court would consider because Rules
regarding joinder do not create a substantive right not to be
sued. Instead, the guiding principle that “Rule 20 should be
84. Coach, Inc. v. 1941coachoutletstore.com, No. 1:11cv309 (JCC/JFA),
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1311 (E.D. Va. Jan. 5, 2012).
85. Id. at *14.
86. Id. at *12-13 (although he does not resolve the merits of the joinder
question, notably, he identifies no error in Magistrate Anderson’s
interpretation of Rule 20(a)(2)).
87. Id. at *13.
88. Id. at *12-13 (quoting Lyons P'ship, L.P. v. D&L Amusement &
Entm't, 702 F. Supp. 2d 104, 112 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)).
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construed in light of its purpose ‘to promote trial convenience
and expedite the final determination of disputes, thereby
preventing multiple lawsuits,’” seems to fit squarely with the
practical justice rendered by Judge Cacheris.89
Had Judge Cacheris not rejected Magistrate Anderson’s
recommendation, this case could have very well meant the end
to the mass domain name lawsuit. But, until the joinder issue
is raised by a non-defaulting defendant the mass domain suit
will remain an available tool for brand owners to attack
counterfeit websites.90
3. Lower Threshold of Evidentiary Support to Establish
Goods are Counterfeit
Another way that the mass domain lawsuits are distinct
from the traditional counterfeit seizure actions is that the
courts appear to accept a lower threshold of proof to support
the brand owner’s allegation that the goods are indeed
counterfeit. Under the Counterfeit Statute, a party may obtain
an order of seizure with regard to counterfeit activity “based on
an affidavit or the verified complaint establishing facts
sufficient to support the findings of fact and conclusions of law
required for such order.”91 In the traditional counterfeit
context, a brand owner would typically satisfy this requirement
by hiring an investigator, who would make a purchase (or
several purchases) of the alleged counterfeit goods. The goods
would then be physically inspected by a corporate
representative who is familiar with the company’s
manufacturing process and use of its brands. Upon finding
such goods to be counterfeit, the representative would prepare
89. Coach, Inc. v. 1941coachoutletstore.com, No. 1:11cv0309 (JCC/JFA),
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150693, at *14-15 (E.D. Va. Nov. 25, 2011) (quoting
Saval v. BL Ltd., 710 F.2d 1027, 1031 (4th Cir. 1983)).
90. Although very unlikely to occur in the counterfeit context
(particularly given there would be no public interest served), Congress has
recently enacted similar laws with regard to patents. See 35 U.S.C. § 299
(West 2011) (recent amendments to the Patent Act under The America
Invents Act mandating that a “patent troll” establish a closer relationship
among defendants before joining them in a single suit for patent
infringement).
91. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(3)(A) (2008).
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an affidavit, pursuant to §1116(d)(3), attesting to the
differences between the brand owner’s genuine products, and
the counterfeit products.
In the mass domain lawsuits several of these steps have
been skipped. In these cases, the brand owners have joined in
one lawsuit as many as several hundred different defendants
accused of selling counterfeit products. The costs alone for
purchasing a sample product from each defendant’s website
would likely make it cost-prohibitive, or at least highly
inefficient to pursue these types of suits. For example, in the
Chanel case in the Western District of Tennessee, the
Complaint identifies 172 defendant domain names.92 The price
of the counterfeit goods at each of these sites ranges from
around $50 – $450, with the average price appearing in the
range of approximately $150.93 In addition to the very timeconsuming process of coordinating a purchase from each of
these locations, the costs for just these purchases alone, would
be approximately $30,000 (not including the fees for an
investigator to perform the test purchases).
Instead, brand owners have taken a different approach. In
many cases, the brand owners have made only a select number
of actual purchases. For example, Chanel’s Manager of Brand
Protection and Enforcement submitted a declaration which
indicated that Chanel’s independent investigator purchased
counterfeit products from only ten of the 172 defendant
domains that were joined in the lawsuit.94 Chanel bolstered
this limited investigation by having its internal Manager
analyze and assess the content and images displayed on the
remaining 162 defendant websites.95 Based solely on this
92. Complaint, Chanel, Inc. v. Does 1-172, No. 2:10-cv-2684-STA-dkv
(W.D. Tenn. Sept. 20, 2010).
93. Aff. of Pilar Toro in Support of Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Application for
Entry of Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction at Ex. 1,
Chanel Inc. v. Does 1-172, No. 2:10-cv-02684-BBD-dkv (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 20,
2010), available at http://servingnotice.com/oft/20%20%20dec%20of%20toro.pdf.
94. Declaration of Brandon Scott in Support of Plaintiff’s Ex Parte
Application for Entry of Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction and Order Temporarily Sealing the File ¶ 4, Chanel Inc. v. Does 1172, No. 2:10-cv-02684-BBD-dkv (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 20, 2010).
95. Declaration of Brandon Scott in Support of Plaintiff’s Ex Parte
Application for Entry of Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
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review, the Manager concluded the websites were offering
counterfeit products. The Manager affirmed the products were
counterfeit based on his “visual inspection of the products, the
pricing of the Chanel branded products listed, which are far
below the prices of similar genuine Chanel products, and
because I personally know Chanel does not conduct business
with Defendants or their websites nor do they have the right or
authority to use the Chanel Marks for any purpose.”96
In a more traditional counterfeit context this declaration
would be glaringly insufficient to establish that the goods being
sold are indeed counterfeit. For example, the fact that Chanel
does not authorize the defendant to sell the products, or that
the products are listed below Chanel’s retail prices, does not
take into account that the goods could be gray market (i.e.,
genuine goods manufactured by the brand owner, but sold
through unauthorized channels), or could be goods that are
used (second hand) and being resold on the website.
The Manager’s visual inspection of the product images is
likewise of limited value, because the Manager never possessed
or inspected the actual product – only a picture that is posted
on the website. In addition to not being able to completely
inspect the physical sample from all angles, it fails to take
account that the picture posted on the website may not be an
actual representation of the product being sold. It takes little
imagination to envision that a counterfeit website may post
pictures of genuine Chanel products (even images copied from
Chanel’s own website) to promote its sale of counterfeit
products.
A second problem exists insofar as the Manager who
inspects the products online states that he goes through the
steps to make a purchase, places the items in an online
shopping cart, but does not actually complete the transaction.97
Accordingly, the brand owner cannot verify for the Court that
the products are actually being sold on the website.98 Seeking
Injunction and Order Temporarily Sealing the File ¶¶ 11-13, Chanel Inc. v.
Does 1-172, No. 2:10-cv-02684-BBD-dkv (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 20, 2010).
96. Id. ¶ 10.
97. Id. ¶ 10.
98. Of course, a party may be liable for infringement for merely offering
to sell a counterfeit product; however, without an actual sale, it would seem
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the extraordinary relief of obtaining an ex parte temporary
restraining order and asset freeze without actually making a
purchase from the defendant and without physically inspecting
the product seems contrary to the strict evidentiary thresholds
traditionally imposed by courts in evaluating whether an ex
parte temporary restraining order is appropriate.99
However, in the present world of online counterfeit sales,
the website owners have solved this problem for the brand
owners. In most instances, physical inspection of the product is
no longer necessary. This is because the counterfeit activity on
the Internet has become so brazen that the counterfeiters no
longer conceal the fact that the products they sell are
counterfeit. Indeed, as Chanel’s Manager explains in his
declaration, many of the websites include disclaimers which
“expressly acknowledge the Chanel branded goods sold thereon
are ‘replica.’”100
An example of this type of admission can be found at the
website located at www.exactwatches.com, where the merchant
proudly proclaims:
Have you always wanted a fake Rolex or a
Breitling replica but always thought it was too
expensive for your budget or even for your taste?
. . . Our fake Rolex watches and Breitling
replicas are some of the best to be created by
man. Experts say that our replicas are so
accurate that they are hard to spot as
“knockoffs.” This means that purchasing a $120watch from us will make you look like the
wealthiest man on your street, simply because
our replicas look so real and authentic.101
Accordingly, in instances, such as with the website located
at exactwatches.com, a test purchase of the counterfeit
products has, in many respects, become redundant. The
counterfeiters themselves have already conceded that their
to present a less compelling basis for granting the extraordinary relief of an
ex parte seizure and asset freeze. See 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(1)(A).
99. See In re Lorillard Tobacco Co., 370 F.3d 982, 989 (9th Cir. 2004).
100. Aff. of Pilar Toro, supra note 93, ¶ 10.
101. EXACT WATCHES, http://www.exactwatches.com (last visited March
6, 2012).
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websites are only selling counterfeits. But for those instances
where a website itself does not expressly admit that the
products being sold are counterfeit, a court arguably could have
a valid basis to refuse to issue an ex parte order of seizure
against a defendant website, let alone hundreds of websites,
based solely on inspection of images found on the website.
4. Directing Third Parties
The temporary restraining orders and preliminary
injunctions issued in the mass domain lawsuits are not
directed solely at the defendants. These orders also direct third
parties to take certain actions related to the infringing
websites.
For example, in the True Religion case the Court ordered
that all banks, payment processors and financial institutions
(including PayPal) shall freeze all financial accounts for the
defendants or the defendants’ websites.102 The asset freeze not
only enjoined these financial institutions from transferring any
funds to the defendants, they also enjoined the institutions
from providing any chargebacks or refunds to any consumers
who (innocently or otherwise) placed orders for the counterfeit
goods.103
Likewise, in the Philip Morris case, the Southern District
of Florida ordered that Western Union shall divert all money
transfers sent to the defendants.104 In doing so, the court noted
that Western Union was licensed to do business in the State of
Florida, and therefore subject to jurisdiction in that district.105
The order permitted Western Union to respond to any customer
inquiries by advising of the pending lawsuit, and directing the
customers to Philip Morris’ counsel who was required to
provide the customers with a report of the status of their
102. Temporary Restraining Order, Order to Disable Certain Web Sites,
Asset Restraining Order, Expedited Discovery Order, and Order to Show
Cause for Preliminary Injunction ¶ 11, True Religion Apparel Group, Inc. v.
Lei, No. 1:11-cv-08242-HB (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2011).
103. Id.
104. Order Granting Application for Entry of Preliminary Injunction at
10:9, Philip Morris USA, Inc., v. Jiang, No. 1:11-cv-24049-KMM (S.D. Fla.
Dec. 12, 2011).
105. Id. at 10:9 n.4.
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transaction.106
Well prior to the institution of these mass domain
lawsuits, many courts, particularly in connection with
counterfeit actions, have directed financial institutions to
freeze a defendant’s assets. In Reebok International v.
Marnatech Enterprises, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that an
asset freeze in a counterfeit lawsuit could be supported by
Federal Rule 64, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1116 and 1117, and the inherent
powers of the Court.107 The Court ultimately concluded that
“[b]ecause the Lanham Act authorizes the district court to
grant [plaintiff] an accounting of [defendant’s] profits as a form
of final equitable relief [under Section 1117], the district court
had the inherent power to freeze [defendant’s] assets in order
to ensure the availability of that final relief.”108 This same
reasoning was adopted by the Eleventh Circuit a few years
later in Levi Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise International Trading.109
The redirection of Western Union transactions pertaining
to the defendants in the Philip Morris case, however, presents
a deviation from the traditional counterfeit defendant asset
freeze. First, the asset freeze is not limited to just funds that
already reside in the defendant’s bank account. The order
requires Western Union to continue to re-direct any monetary
transfers that would otherwise be delivered to the
defendants.110
Second, in these types of cases, a counterfeit defendant is
likely to be operating more than one counterfeit website. This
creates the likelihood that, although some of the defendants’
websites may be disabled per the courts’ TRO, others are likely
not included in the order and may continue to operate. These
other websites presumably continue to receive monetary
transfers through Western Union from consumer purchases
from the non-disabled websites. Accordingly, the court’s order,

106. Id. at 11:11.
107. See Reebok Int'l, LTD. v. Marnatech Enters. Inc., 970 F.2d 552,
558-60 (9th Cir. 1992).
108. Id.
109. 51 F.3d 982, 987 (11th Cir. 1995).
110. Order Granting Application for Entry of Preliminary Injunction at
10:9-11, Philip Morris USA, Inc., v. Jiang, No. 1:11-CV-24049-KMM (S.D.
Fla. Dec. 12, 2011).
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which compels redirection of all Western Union transfers to the
defendants, as opposed to just transactions pertaining to the
disabled websites, not only impacts assets already held in a
defendant’s bank account, but also creates a situation whereby,
on an ongoing basis, funds from consumer purchases from
surviving defendant-operated counterfeit websites are redirected and held during the pendency of the case. In other
words, long after the court issues a TRO, consumers visiting
other websites owned by the defendants, may have their funds
redirected by Western Union and seized by the court.
In addition, several of the court orders in these mass
domain lawsuits require the relevant registries to transfer the
domain names to an account with GoDaddy.com, Inc., where
they are held in trust for the Court during the pendency of the
case, and redirected to a website that displays the pleadings
and court filings for the lawsuit.111
In a traditional counterfeit lawsuit, the scope of the order
of seizure and preliminary injunction is typically limited to
confiscation of, and an injunction pertaining to, counterfeit
products bearing the moving plaintiff’s brands. It is firmly held
that “[i]njunctive relief should be narrowly tailored to fit
specific legal violations.”112 In the mass domain lawsuits, the
courts have directed third parties to disable not only the
portions of the infringing websites that pertain to sales of
products bearing the brand owner’s trademarks, but the
defendants’ entire websites, including portions of these
websites that are dedicated to sales of products that do not use
the moving parties’ brands (but likely infringe on other, nonparty, brands). Applied to the typical “brick and mortar”
counterfeit action, this would be the equivalent of directing a
landlord to lock a tenant’s entire store, without notice, and
deposit the key with the court until the conclusion of the
lawsuit, even if that tenant sells a variety of products that do
not bear the plaintiff’s trademark, and are not the subject of
111. Order Granting Ex Parte Application For Entry of Temporary
Restraining Order at 7, Chanel, Inc. v. Does 1-172, No. 2:10-CV-2684-BBDdkv (W.D. Tenn. Nov. 4, 2010).
112. Patsy's Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty, Inc., 317 F.3d 209, 220 (2d Cir.
2003) (quoting Waldman Pub. Corp. v. Landoll, Inc., 43 F.3d 775, 785 (2d
Cir.1994)); see also N. Face Apparel Corp. v. TC Fashions, Inc., No. 05 Civ.
9083 (RMB), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14226 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2006).
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the claims asserted in the lawsuit. Such an extreme form of
relief would almost certainly garner greater scrutiny in the
traditional “brick and mortar” context.
The effectiveness of the domain name transfer is largely
dependent on the case file remaining sealed until the transfer
is complete. As explained by Chanel in the Tennessee lawsuit:

[T]he Defendants operate Internet websites
which they optimize for the sale of counterfeit
Chanel merchandise. The optimization process
provides the Defendants with their power to
unfairly compete with Chanel by catapulting
their illegal websites into search engine results.
All of the optimization power which has been
built through the illegal use of the Chanel Marks
can easily be transferred to a new domain name
in a matter of minutes through what is known as
a redirect. A redirect is essentially a command
which instructs search engines such as Google to
transfer or redirect all traffic and the benefits
thereof to a new domain name. . . . The only way
to avoid the probability of successful redirects to
evade an injunction is to secure and disable the
domain names in advance of notice to the
Defendants or the public.113
The redirection of the infringing domains to a website that
displays information regarding the pending lawsuit serves
several functions. First, as discussed above, it provides a
means for serving notice and process on the defendants
regarding the seizure of their website and the filings with the
Court. Second, perhaps the most obvious, is that it terminates
the infringing sales and use of the counterfeit marks (at least
at this one particular site), and disrupts the counterfeit
defendant’s efforts to maintain a prominent presence in search
113. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Chanel, Inc.’s
Ex Parte Application for Entry of Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction and Order Temporarily Sealing the File at 28-29,
Chanel Inc. v. Does 1-172, No. 2:10-cv-02684-SHM-dkv (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 21,
2010).

29

LINDENBAUMMACRO 65 PAGES

596

11/13/2012 9:07 AM

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:3

engine results for the counterfeit goods. Third, it provides
notice to consumers (unsuspecting or otherwise) that the
products being offered at these websites (and by inference
many others), are unlawful, and that brand owners, and the
courts are taking legal measures to enjoin such activity.
The result of these actions should not only be a deterrent
against those who knowingly patronize these types of
counterfeit websites, but also protection for naïve consumers,
who may unknowingly be purchasing counterfeits, or supplying
credit card and personal information to a phishing site.
Finally, redirection of the counterfeit websites provides
free access to the case file for the general public, including
consumer watch groups, so that the arguments presented to
the Court, and the relief being granted by the Court, may be
closely monitored, and where appropriate, challenged.
5. Setting a Low Bond
To obtain an Order permitting seizure of counterfeit goods,
a plaintiff must post a bond.114 Section 1116(d)(4) states that
the “court shall not grant such an application unless the person
obtaining an order under this subsection provides the security
determined adequate by the court for the payment of such
damages as any person may be entitled to recover as a result of
a wrongful seizure or wrongful attempted seizure under this
subsection.”115 The court has discretion to determine the
appropriate amount of a bond posted in connection with a
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order.116 In
setting the amount of a bond, some courts maintain they
should “err on the side of caution—that is, toward larger
bonds—in light of the need to protect the unrepresented
defendant, and to ensure that the defendant will have an
effective remedy if he or she is the victim of a wrongful
seizure.”117
114. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(4) (2006); Hoechst Diafoil Co. v. Nan Ya
Plastics Corp., 174 F.3d 411, 421 (4th Cir. 1999).
115. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(4)(A) (2006).
116. Hoechst, 174 F.3d at 421.
117. Time Warner Entm't Co. v. Does, 876 F. Supp. 407, 411 (E.D.N.Y.
1994) (citing 130 Cong. Rec. H12076 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1984) (statement of
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The potential recovery for a wrongful seizure brought
under 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d) is limited to the amount of the bond
that is posted by the plaintiff.118 In the two Chanel cases and
the Tiffany case discussed above, the courts required the
plaintiffs to post a bond in the amount of $20,000.119 In the
True Religion case, the New York court only required a bond of
$10,000.120 And in the Philip Morris case, the court required a
bond of $100,000.121 Given the blatant acts of counterfeiting
complained of in each of these lawsuits, the amounts of these
bonds, at first glance, seem reasonable. However, the
sufficiency of the bonds must be analyzed in light of the huge
number of defendants and domains that are joined in the single
lawsuit. For example, in the True Religion case, an order of
seizure was issued with regard to 86 separate defendant
domains. Thus, each seized domain is potentially secured by
only $116.27. The Chanel action in Las Vegas, secured by a
$20,000 bond, identifies 399 domains.122 Here, each domain
may be secured by only $50.12.
Naturally, it is extremely unlikely that in a case brought
against, for example 399 counterfeit websites, that each would
succeed in challenging the seizure, and be entitled to a portion
Rep. McCarthy)) (“Congress noted that the provision of a bond is one of the
critical procedural protections designed to ensure that the defendant's rights
are adequately protected during the course of an ex parte seizure.”).
118. Blau v. YMI Jeanswear, Inc., No. CV 02-09551 FMC (SHSx), 2003
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27432, at *22 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2003).
119. Order Granting Application for Preliminary Injunction at 11,
Chanel, Inc. v. Does 1-172, No. 2:10-CV-2684-BBD-dkv (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 3,
2011); Order Granting Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Application for Entry of
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, Chanel, Inc. v.
The P’ships and Unincorporated Ass’ns Identified on Sch. “A”, 2:11-CV-1508KJD-PAL (D. Nev. Sept. 26, 2011); Order Granting Plaintiff’s Ex Parte
Application for Entry of Temporary Restraining Order, Tiffany v. Does, 2:11CV-590-LDG-CWH (D. Nev. May 11, 2011).
120. See Temporary Restraining Order, Order to Disable Certain Web
Sites, Asset Restraining Order, Expedited Discovery Order and Order to
Show Cause for Preliminary Injunction at 12, True Religion Apparel, Inc. v.
Lei, 1:11-CV-8242-HB (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2011).
121. See Order Granting Application for Entry of Preliminary Injunction
at 11, Philip Morris v. Jiang, No. 1:11-CV-24049-KMM (S.D. Fla. Dec. 12,
2011).
122. See Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Chanel, Inc. v. The P’ships and
Unincorporated Ass’ns Identified on Sch. “A”, 2:11-CV-1508-KJD-PAL (D.
Nev. Sept. 20, 2012).
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of the bond. However, it seems equally unlikely that the courts
have fully considered the ramifications should this occur,
whereby one of these defendants could be left with a mere $50
as secured damages resulting from an improper seizure of its
website.
D. Evaluating the Effectiveness of the Mass Domain Lawsuit
To date, the mass domain lawsuits have been effective in
achieving their immediate purpose, namely to disable a large
number of counterfeit websites and interrupt the flow of funds
generated from these sites. Statistically, the ratio of websites
disrupted compared to the number of mass domain lawsuits
filed is impressive. Notwithstanding its success, it is premature
to determine whether the mass domain lawsuit can effectively
curtail the expansion of online counterfeit websites.
First, the mass domain lawsuit format has yet to be
challenged by any defendant, as all of the defendants in these
lawsuits have defaulted (or have been dismissed) without
posing any substantive challenge. Some of the potential
vulnerabilities of the mass domain lawsuit format were
highlighted in the Coach case discussed above. However, until
a defendant attempts to defend its website, rather than default,
it remains to be seen whether this type of lawsuit could
ultimately withstand challenge.
Second, although the brand owners’ success in disabling a
large volume of websites with the filing of just a few lawsuits is
remarkable, these efforts may be undermined if the counterfeit
website owners can keep pace by creating new sites, or by
redirecting old sites, to replace those that were disabled by
these lawsuits. Given the incredibly large number of
counterfeit websites that already exist, with new sites popping
up every day, it is unlikely that the website owners can be outpaced by only the mass domain lawsuits. However, hope
remains that a brand owner, through the diligent employment
of these mass domain lawsuits, combined with some other
aggressive tools, including those discussed in the next section,
can, at minimum, eliminate a counterfeiter’s incentive to
peddle counterfeit products bearing that company’s brand.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/1

32

LINDENBAUMMACRO 65 PAGES

2012]

11/13/2012 9:07 AM

CATCH ME IF YOU CAN

599

III. Termination of Counterfeit Merchant Accounts Through
Cooperation with Payment Processors
Suing Doe defendants and websites en masse has thus far
proven an efficient means of pursuing counterfeiters directly.
However, trademark law also affords brand owners the
potential to recover from secondary infringers who induce
infringement or knowingly provide their services to
counterfeiters. With internet counterfeiting largely dependent
on credit card transactions, brand owners exploring theories of
secondary liability are now “following the money.” This Part
will discuss brand owners’ options for holding credit card
associations accountable for the acts of counterfeiting
transacted through their networks. It will also consider the
card associations’ incentives and responsibilities for assisting
brand owners’ efforts to disrupt counterfeiters’ businesses.
A. Understanding Credit Card Transactions
1. Overview of Payment System
The starting point for a brand owner seeking to hold thirdparty service providers liable is to identify who are the players,
and what are their roles. To understand the applicability of
secondary liability in the context of credit card payment
processing, it is necessary to distinguish the two primary
models for credit card transactions: the Visa/MasterCard
model, and the American Express/Discover model. In each
model, the card association’s (i.e., Visa, American Express)
relationships with merchants (here, the counterfeiters) and
cardholders differ.
The Visa/MasterCard model is known as a “four-party”
system.123 In a four-party system, a credit card transaction
123. MASTERCARD WORLDWIDE, BENEFITS OF OPEN PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND
(2008), available at
http://www.mastercard.com/us/company/en/docs/BENEFITS%20OF%20ELEC
TRONIC%20PAYMENTS%20-%20US%20EDITION.pdf [hereinafter
MASTERCARD BENEFITS] ; Visa, Inc., Visa Transaction, ABOUT VISA,
http://corporate.visa.com/about-visa/our-business/visa-transaction.shtml (last
visited Mar. 6, 2012); ANN KJOS, THE MERCHANT-ACQUIRING SIDE OF THE
THE ROLE OF INTERCHANGE

33

LINDENBAUMMACRO 65 PAGES

600

11/13/2012 9:07 AM

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:3

involves (1) a cardholder; (2) the financial institution that
issues the cardholder’s credit card; (3) the merchant; and (4)
the financial institution that “acquires” the merchant’s
account.124 The financial institutions described in (2) and (4)
are commonly referred to as “issuing banks” and “acquiring
banks,” respectively.125 Though it is referred to as a four-party
system, in practice, there are often more than four parties
involved in a credit card transaction, as the acquiring banks
typically outsource all merchant-acquiring services other than
financing.126
Moreover, the designation “four-party system” does not
count the payment network or card association involved. This
omission likely stems from the fact that, until recently, Visa
and MasterCard were structured as non-profit, joint ventures
owned by the issuing and acquiring banks themselves.127 In
their respective systems, Visa and MasterCard operate the
payment network that allows the issuing and acquiring banks
using that network to communicate and transmit funds in
order to authorize, clear, and settle transactions.128 In addition
to providing a medium for issuing and acquiring banks to
communicate, Visa and MasterCard promulgate operating
regulations governing use of their payment networks by their
client financial institutions and, by imposing duties upon those
institutions, merchants.129 Among other things, these operating
PAYMENT CARD INDUSTRY: STRUCTURE, OPERATIONS, AND CHALLENGES 2 (2007),
available at http://www.philadelphiafed.org/payment-cardscenter/publications/discussionpapers/2007/D2007OctoberMerchantAcquiring.pdf (the four-party system is
also known as an “open-loop” system, or “bank-centered payment networks”).
124. Visa Transaction, supra note 123.
125. KJOS, supra note 123, at 2.
126. Adam J. Levitin, Priceless? The Competitive Costs of Credit Card
Merchant Restraints (Georgetown Law Faculty Working Papers, Paper No.
22, 2007), available at http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/fwps_papers/22.
127. Id. at 6; United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 235 (2d
Cir. 2003). Before going public, Visa and MasterCard’s profits were “held
basically as security accounts, to pay merchants in the event a member bank
defaults on a payment obligation.” Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d at 235.
128. Payment Processing, MASTERCARD WORLDWIDE,
http://www.mastercard.com/us/company/en/whatwedo/payment_processing.ht
ml (last visited March 5, 2012).
129. MASTERCARD WORLDWIDE, MASTERCARD RULES, 5-1 to 5-20 (2012),
available at http://www.mastercard.com/us/merchant/pdf/BM-
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regulations are designed to manage risk,130 monitor merchant
activities, and protect the VISA and MASTERCARD brands.131
Visa and MasterCard do not directly contract with
cardholders or merchants. Rather, it is the issuing and
acquiring banks, or often their own agents or third-party
contractors, that form direct relationships with the cardholders
and merchants.132 As part of their relationship with
cardholders, issuing banks perform functions such as extending
credit, issuing billing statements, and collecting payments.133
On the merchant side, acquiring banks manage merchant
accounts, process payments,134 and provide merchants with a
gateway to interface with the payment network and the issuing
banks.135
2. Anatomy of a Credit Card Transaction
To better understand the four parties’ roles, it is helpful to
consider the anatomy of a typical credit card transaction. There
are three discrete stages in a credit card transaction:
authorization, clearing, and settlement. Authorization occurs
Entire_Manual_public.pdf [hereinafter MASTERCARD RULES]; VISA, VISA
INTERNATIONAL OPERATING REGULATIONS 400-17 (2012), available at
http://usa.visa.com/download/merchants/visa-international-operatingregulations-main.pdf.
130. Acquiring banks and issuing banks bear different types of risk.
Ramon P. DeGennaro, Merchant Acquirers and Payment Card Processors: A
Look Inside the Black Box, 91 FED. RES. BANK OF ATLANTA ECON. REV. 27, 3437 (2006), available at
http://www.frbatlanta.org/filelegacydocs/erq106_degennaro.pdf. An issuing
bank, which extends credit to cardholders, bears the risk of the cardholder
defaulting on payment. Id. Acquiring banks bear risk with respect to
transactions disputed by cardholders, also known as “chargebacks.” Id. In the
case of a chargeback, the acquiring bank indemnifies the issuing bank (who
indemnifies the cardholder) for the purchase price; if the merchant has
inadequate funds to cover the chargeback, the acquiring bank is left holding
the bag. Id.
131. MASTERCARD RULES, supra note 129, at 4-1 to 4-2; VISA, supra note
129, at 104.
132. KJOS, supra note 123, at 2-3.
133. DeGennaro, supra note 130, at 31.
134. See id. Some, often larger, acquirers process payments themselves;
others, often smaller, resell the processing services of third parties. Id.
135. Id.
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before any funds are actually transmitted between banks,
consisting of the approval or denial of a proposed
transaction.136 During clearing and settlement, funds are
transmitted between banks, the cardholder is billed, and bank
and network fees are deducted from the amount remitted to the
merchant.137
A transaction begins with the cardholder swiping her card
at a merchant’s payment terminal, or submitting her card
information through a website. The terminal (or website)
transmits the cardholder’s information to the acquiring bank.
Next, the acquiring bank submits this information into the
payment network, which then routes the information to the
cardholder’s issuing bank. After receiving the card information
and querying the cardholder’s account, if approved, the issuing
bank transmits an authorization through the payment network
back to the initiating acquiring bank. The acquiring bank
forwards the authorization to the merchant, permitting the
transaction to go forward.138 This ends the authorization stage.
Though at this point the buyer has already left with her
goods (or has perhaps received a purchase and delivery
confirmation by email), the back-end processes of clearance and
settlement continue. To initiate these processes, the merchant
must submit its transactions to its acquiring bank to begin
clearance and settlement – the point at which funds are
deposited into the merchant’s account for the purchased goods,
and the participating parties make their money. Upon receipt
of transaction information, the issuing bank will bill the
appropriate cardholder’s account with the purchase amount,
and remit the purchase amount, less the “interchange fee”
prescribed by the card association, through the payment
network. As the funds make their way to the acquiring bank,
the card association will deduct an “assessment fee” for its own
services, and pass on the remainder to the acquiring bank.139
136. Visa Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 7 (Nov. 19, 2010),
available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1403161/000119312510265236/d10k.
htm.
137. Id.
138. KJOS, supra note 123, at 4-5.
139. Id. at 20.
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Likewise, the acquiring bank deducts a fee of its own, and
credits the merchant’s account with what remains. Together,
the interchange fee retained by the issuing bank, the
assessments fee retained by the card association, and acquiring
fee retained by the acquiring bank comprise the “merchant
discount fee.”140
3. The Three-Party System
In contrast, American Express and Discover operate under
a “three-party system,”141 or “closed” network.142 The primary
difference from the Visa/MasterCard model is that in the threeparty system used by American Express and Discover, “the
generally independent functions of issuers, acquirers, and
networks that exist in the Visa/MasterCard models are
collapsed into one entity.”143 That is, unlike Visa and
MasterCard, American Express and Discover not only manage
the payment network, but traditionally also play the role of
issuing bank and acquiring bank, forming direct contractual
relationships with cardholders and merchants to use and
accept their payment cards.144 To the average cardholder, the
difference between three- and four-party systems may seem
academic. But for purposes of a card association’s exposure to
contributory liability for merchants’ infringements, the
distinction may be critical.
B. Contributory Liability and Payment Processors
In two prominent cases, brand owners have sought to have
card associations, acquiring banks, and/or payment processors
answer for the infringements of the merchants they serve.
Because they are processing payments, not peddling
counterfeit goods themselves, the theories of liability advanced
against participants in credit card payment processing center
140. Id. at 20-21.
141. MASTERCARD BENEFITS, supra note 123, at 3.
142. United States v. Visa U.S.A. Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 322, 333
(S.D.N.Y. 1991).
143. KJOS, supra note 123, at 3.
144. KJOS, supra note 123, at 3; Levitin, supra note 126, at 7.

37

LINDENBAUMMACRO 65 PAGES

604

11/13/2012 9:07 AM

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:3

on the doctrines of vicarious and contributory trademark
infringement. A vicarious infringer is “one who has an
apparent or actual partnership with the infringer or who
exercises joint ownership or control over the infringing
product.”145 In contrast, contributory liability extends to those
who “knowingly cooperate in illegal and tortuous activity.”146
Though plaintiffs have advanced both theories of secondary
liability (as well as unsuccessful claims for direct infringement)
against participants in credit card payment processing, for
purposes of this article, the discussion of card networks’
potential liability will be limited to the doctrine of contributory
liability.
1. Development of Contributory Liability for Service
Providers
The recent extension (and attempted extension) of
contributory liability to service providers, and particularly to
participants in credit card payment processing, has its roots in
the Supreme Court’s decision in Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v.
Ives Laboratories., Inc.147 Inwood involved a dispute between
two prescription drug manufacturers. Inwood allegedly sold its
generic drug in identically colored capsules as Ives, inducing
pharmacists to mislabel Inwood’s generic drug with Ives’
registered trademark, CYCLOSPASMOL.148 On this basis, Ives
sued Inwood for trademark infringement. The district court
denied Ives’ request for a preliminary injunction, and in a
bench trial, entered judgment for the defendant, Inwood.149 The
Second Circuit reversed, finding Inwood liable for contributory
145. 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 25:22 (4th ed. 2011).
146. Id. § 25:17.
147. 456 U.S. 844 (1982). Inwood was not the Supreme Court’s first
exposure to secondary liability. For a discussion of pre-Inwood contributory
liability case law, see Charles W. Adams, Indirect Infringement from a Tort
Law Perspective, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 635, 675-77 (2008).
148. 456 U.S. at 850.
149. Ives Labs., Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 455 F. Supp. 939 (E.D.N.Y.
1978), aff’d, 601 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1979) (denying preliminary injunction);
Ives Labs., Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 488 F. Supp. 394, 397-98 (E.D.N.Y. 1980)
(denying Ives’ claim for contributory trademark infringement under Lanham
Act § 32), rev’d, 638 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1981).
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trademark infringement.150
The Supreme Court then reversed the Second Circuit’s
decision, finding that the trial court’s denial of Ives’
contributory infringement claim was not clearly erroneous.151
However, the Supreme Court confirmed that a manufacturer
could be held liable even where it did not “directly control”
pharmacists who mislabeled the drug with another’s
trademark.152 The Court articulated a two-pronged doctrine of
contributory liability, where a manufacturer or distributor
could be found contributorily liable if it “intentionally induces
another to infringe a trademark, or if it continues to supply its
product to one whom it knows or has reason to know is
engaging in trademark infringement.”153
A decade later, Inwood was applied outside of the
manufacturer/distributor and “product” contexts. The United
States Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and Ninth Circuit,
drawing upon the tort law concept of premises liability, held
that operators of flea markets and swap meets could be held
contributorily liable for the trademark infringements
committed by vendors on their premises.154 And just a few
years thereafter, the Ninth Circuit decided what has become
the seminal case in extending Inwood’s concept of contributory
liability to service providers: Lockheed Martin v. Network
Solutions, Inc.155
In Lockheed, the defendant was a domain name
registrar.156 The plaintiff, owner of the service mark SKUNK
WORKS had notified the defendant of domain name
150. 638 F.2d at 540.
151. 456 U.S. at 858. Because the Second Circuit did not consider Ives’
unfair competition claims under § 43(a) and state law, the Supreme Court
remanded these issues. Id. at 859.
152. Id. at 853-54.
153. Id. at 854 (citing William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265
U.S. 526 (1924); Coca-Cola Co. v. Snow Crest Beverages, Inc., 64 F.Supp. 980
(Mass. 1946), aff'd, 162 F.2d 280 (1st Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 809
(1947)).
154. Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d
1143, 1149 (7th Cir. 1992) (contributory liability may attach to flea market
operator); accord, Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 265 (9th
Cir. 1996) (swap meet operator).
155. 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999).
156. Id. at 982.
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registrations containing its service mark or confusingly similar
variations, demanded that the domains be cancelled, and
demanded that the defendant refuse to register any like
domains in the future.157 When the defendant did not comply,
the plaintiff sued for contributory infringement, as well as
other claims under the Lanham Act.158
Because the defendant registrar provided to the thirdparty infringers a service, rather than a product, the case did
not fit neatly within the Inwood mold. Building upon the
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Hard Rock, and its own in
Fonovisa, the Ninth Circuit adapted the second prong of the
Inwood test to the context of service providers.159 In
determining whether a service provider would be held liable for
contributory infringement, the Court looked to “the extent of
control exercised by the defendant over the third party’s means
of infringement.”160 The Court concluded that contributory
liability would arise where the service provider exercised
“[d]irect control and monitoring of the instrumentality used by
a third party to infringe the plaintiff’s mark.”161 Ultimately, the
defendant’s rote translation of domain names into
corresponding internet protocol addresses was insufficient to
warrant a finding of contributory liability.162
2. Application of Contributory Infringement Doctrine to
Payment Processors
a. Perfect 10 v. Visa International Service Association
The Ninth Circuit had an opportunity to apply the
Lockheed standard directly to payment processors and card
associations in Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa International Service
157. Id. at 982-83.
158. Id. at 983.
159. Id. at 984-85.
160. Id. at 984 (citing Hard Rock Café Licensing Corp. v. Concession
Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1148-49 (7th Cir. 1992)).
161. Lockheed, 194 F.3d at 984. The Lockheed standard’s requirement of
“control” has been criticized as an incorrect application of vicarious liability
concepts to the realm of contributory liability. See Adams, supra note 147, at
681-82.
162. Lockheed, 194 F.3d at 984-85.
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Association.163 In that case, the plaintiff, the publisher of a
subscription website providing photographs of nude models
brought claims for contributory trademark infringement
against the card associations, Visa and MasterCard, as well as
an acquiring bank and payment processor.164 The plaintiff
alleged that after receiving notice of third-party’s unauthorized
distribution of plaintiff’s copyrighted images (which copies also
bore the PERFECT 10 trademark), the defendants continued to
process payments for those third parties.165 Applying the test
devised in Lockheed, the district court dismissed all of the
plaintiff’s claims under Rule 12(b)(6),166 and the plaintiff
appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
In affirming the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s
claims, the majority agreed that the plaintiff failed to plead
sufficient facts to support a contributory infringement claim
under the Lockheed standard. The widespread use of credit
cards for Internet transactions was not lost on the majority,
which acknowledged that “credit cards serve as the primary
engine of electronic commerce.”167 Nevertheless, the majority
did not consider the infringement – unauthorized distribution –
to be dependent on the direct infringers’ ability to accept credit
card payments; that is, the infringing photographs could be
distributed whether or not a sale was completed using a credit
card, or at all.168 This led the majority to the critical (and for
163. 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007).
164. Id. at 793.
165. Id.
166. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d 1736 (N.D.
Cal. 2004).
167. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788, 794 (9th Cir.
2007).
168. Id. at 807. In reaching its conclusions as to the instrumentality of
infringement for purposes of contributory trademark infringement, the
majority incorporates (without reference) its rationale “[a]s discussed at
length above.” Id. The most reasonable interpretation is that the majority is
referring to prior statements made in the context of contributory copyright
infringement, such as “Perfect 10 has not alleged that any infringing material
passes over Defendants’ payment networks or through their payment
processing systems,” and “[w]hile Perfect 10 has alleged that Defendants
make it easier for websites to profit from this infringing activity, the issue
here is reproduction, alteration, display and distribution, which can occur
without payment.” Id. at 796 (emphasis added). These statements coincide
with the majority’s view that the payment network is neither involved in nor
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plaintiff, fatal) holding that it was the infringing websites, not
the defendants’ payment network, or any combination of the
two, that was the “instrumentality used to infringe the
plaintiff’s mark.”169 Having thus defined the instrumentality of
infringement, the Court continued to note that the defendant
card associations and payment processors were not alleged to
have “the power to remove infringing material from these
websites or directly stop their distribution over the Internet.”170
While the defendants did have the ability to cease processing
payments, which might stop or reduce the infringements (or
might not, as the majority stressed throughout its opinion171),
the defendants did not exercise the “direct control” over the
instrumentality, as required by Lockheed.172
Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski wrote an impassioned dissent
in Perfect 10, arguing that because “credit cards are directly
involved in every infringing transaction,” the defendants
effectively “control whether such transactions will go
forward.”173 Where the majority sought to divorce the “means of
payment” from the “mechanics of transferring the material,”
Kozinski colorfully argued that “[i]n a commercial
environment, distribution and payment are . . . like love and
marriage-you can’t have one without the other.”174 This, Judge
Kozinski believed, was control enough for the plaintiff to
satisfy the Lockheed test and survive a motion to dismiss.175
(However, Judge Kozinski did note that, given the defendants’
differing roles in processing payments, the ultimate question of
liability could turn on whether the defendants had direct

essential to the alleged infringements.
169. Id. at 807.
170. Id.
171. See, e.g., id. at 796, 798, 807.
172. Id. at 807. Among the criticisms of Perfect 10 is the majority’s
failure to distinguish between the card association defendants, the acquiring
bank defendant, and processor defendant – all of whose relationships to the
direct infringers differ. See, e.g., id. at 811 n.2 (noting “simplifying
assumptions” used by majority); Kelly K. Yang, Paying for Infringement:
Implicating Credit Card Networks in Secondary Trademark Liability, 26
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 687, 706-10 (2011).
173. 494 F.3d at 821 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 818 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 822 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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relationships with the infringing merchants).176 The Kozinski
dissent would be influential the next time contributory
infringement claims were levied against payment processors.
b. Gucci v. Frontline Processing Corp.
Where Perfect 10 marked an outright victory for payment
processors, the Southern District of New York’s recent decision
in Gucci America, Inc. v. Frontline Processing Corp.177
introduces
uncertainty.
In
Frontline,
luxury
goods
manufacturer Gucci America, Inc., having first obtained
judgment against “Laurette,” an internet seller of replica
GUCCI products,178 brought suit against two acquiring banks
and/or payment processors,179 Frontline Processing Corp. and
Woodforest National Bank, as well as Durango Merchant
Services LLC, an alleged agent aiding the processors in
locating merchants.180
The three named defendants were alleged to have supplied
credit card processing services for Laurette, enabling sales of
counterfeit goods through the website TheBagAddiction.com.181
Durango was found to have “specializ[ed] in services for ‘High
Risk Merchant Accounts’”182 such as sellers of replica goods.183
176. Id. at 811 n.2 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). This observation suggests
the possibility of different outcomes between card associations and acquiring
banks/payment processors in four-party systems, as well as between card
associations in four-party and three-party systems (e.g., Visa and
MasterCard).
177. 721 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
178. See Gucci America, Inc. v. Laurette Co., No. 08-cv-5065 (LAK)
(S.D.N.Y. Jun. 3, 2008).
179. See Frontline Processing Corp., 721 F. Supp. 2d at 239 n.3 (“Neither
party has provided sufficiently clear terminology to describe Woodforest or
Frontline. For the purposes of this opinion, terms like ‘acquiring bank’ and
‘credit card processors’ are intended to have the same meaning and do not
imply anything about their services beyond what is alleged in the
complaint.”).
180. Id. at 238.
181. Id. at 239.
182. Id. at 238. It is not uncommon for those catering to high-risk
merchants to specifically reference “replica products” in their literature. See,
e.g., PAINLESS PROCESSING, http://www.painlessprocessing.com/replicamerchant-account.php (last visited Mar. 7, 2012) (“We at Painless Processing
specialize in getting our clients approval for high risk merchant accounts
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In providing these services to Laurette, Durango allegedly
devised a system designed to aid Laurette in avoiding
chargebacks, which the court construed as “‘affirmative steps
taken to foster infringement.’”184 The court concluded that, as
to Durango, Gucci had sufficiently pleaded a claim for relief
under the inducement prong of Inwood.185
The district court, noting that the Second Circuit had not
adopted Lockheed – or what it deemed the modified part of the
Inwood test – nevertheless found it a “persuasive synthesis” for
adjudging allegations of contributory trademark infringement
against service providers such as Frontline and Woodforest.186
However, the court set forth an arguably relaxed version of the
Lockheed test, assessing contributory liability by evaluating
whether Frontline and Woodforest “knowingly supplied
services to websites and had sufficient control over infringing
activity to merit liability.”187
Frontline and Woodforest’s knowledge of Laurette’s
infringement was established by their involvement in
reviewing Laurette’s website and investigating consumer

including replica merchant accounts.”); REPLICA MERCHANT ACCOUNTS,
MerchantAccount-highrisk.com, http://merchantaccount-highrisk.com/replicamerchant-account.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2012) (“Need a merchant account
for a replica merchandise business? Then you need a high risk, replica
merchant account . . . .We can enable you to process payments.”); When a
Web-Based Business Needs Replica Merchant Account, GSPAY.COM,
http://www.gspay.com/when-a-web-based-business-needs-replica-merchantaccount.php (last visited Mar. 7, 2012) (“Online merchant account will give
you complete independence. It will help make your web replica business more
successful and profitable. . . . Boost the potential of your business with replica
merchant account!”).
183. 721 F. Supp. 2d at 238.
184. Id. at 249.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 248 (quoting Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d
463, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)); see also Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93,
105-06 (2d Cir. 2010) (“We therefore assume without deciding that Inwood’s
test for contributory trademark infringement governs.”).
187. 721 F. Supp. 2d at 248 (emphasis added); The court reiterates the
standard as requiring sufficient control. Id. at 249. The court later states that
“[p]laintiff provides sufficient factual allegations to establish a claim that
Woodforest and Frontline had some control over the directly infringing thirdparty, but fails to provide enough facts to show control on the part of
Durango.” Id. at 251 (emphasis added).
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chargebacks for items purchased from TheBagAddiction.com.188
As to the control element, the court defined the instrumentality
of infringement as “the combination of the website and the
credit card network, since both are allegedly necessary
elements for the infringing act.”189 The court draws heavily
from Judge Kozinski’s dissent in Perfect 10 to establish the
interconnectedness of the website and payment network,
reasoning that “[i]f, as Gucci alleges, the Laurette website was
functionally dependent upon Woodforest and Frontline’s credit
card processing services to sell counterfeit Gucci products, it
would be sufficient to demonstrate the control needed for
liability.”190
Interestingly, the Frontline court follows Judge Kozinski’s
reasoning in holding that distribution and payment are
inseparable (like love and marriage), while also accepting, or at
least not explicitly rejecting, the Perfect 10 majority’s
conclusion that the two may be separable.191 In so holding, the
Frontline court distinguishes Perfect 10: “the infringing conduct
[in Perfect 10] was the publication on the website of
trademarked images of nude models, and the distribution
occurred via individuals viewing and taking the image directly
from the website.”192 If Perfect 10 and Frontline are to be read
as consistent with one another, it would seem that the different
outcomes hinge on whether the directly infringing product is
non-rivalrous (Perfect 10) or rivalrous (Frontline).193 That is, it
is conceivable that the Perfect 10 infringers could continue to
distribute free electronic copies of the infringing photos, as
doing so would not impair their ability to meet paying
customers’ demand for electronic copies. In contrast, because
the Frontline direct infringer, Laurette, dealt in physical goods,
it would be far less likely to distribute products without a
functional payment network.
188. Id. at 249-50.
189. Id. at 252.
190. Id. at 253.
191. Id. at 252.
192. Id.
193. Eric Goldman, Payment Service Providers May Be Liable for
Counterfeit Website Sales--Gucci v. Frontline, ERIC GOLDMAN TECH. &
MARKETING L. BLOG (June 29, 2010, 12:19 PM),
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2010/06/payment_service.htm.
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Thus, Gucci was able to defeat a motion to dismiss its
claims for contributory infringement against Durango
(inducement theory) and Frontline and Woodforest (knowing
supply of services theory). However, Frontline did not result in
a finding of contributory liability against any of the defendants,
since the parties settled out of court.194 But in finding that
Gucci had stated claims for contributory infringement against
the defendant payment processor, acquiring bank, and agent,
Frontline introduces uncertainty for payment processors as to
their legal obligations and potential liabilities. Frontline
suggests that card networks such as American Express and
Discover, which themselves perform the functions performed by
acquiring banks in four-party systems may be susceptible to
claims for contributory liability for the infringements of their
merchants. Frontline even leaves open the possibility of
liability for card associations such as Visa and MasterCard,
despite their lack of direct relationships with infringing
merchants.
C. Credit Card Associations’ Cooperation with Brand Owners
1. Card
Policies

Associations’

Voluntary

Anti-Counterfeiting

Card associations have incentives for keeping unsavory or
criminal merchants from plying their trade through the
associations’ payment networks. In some cases, as with
internet gambling, the incentive is to avoid indirect liability
under the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act
(UIGEA)195 by “establish[ing] and implement[ing] written
policies and procedures reasonably designed to identify and
block or otherwise prevent or prohibit” use of the payment
networks for internet gambling.196
194. Final Order and Judgment on Consent at 1-2, Gucci America, Inc.
v. Frontline Processing Corp., 721 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 09-cv6925), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/newyork/nysdce/1:2009cv06925/350358/90/0.pdf?ts=1286286153.
195. Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006, Pub. L. No.
109-347, 120 Stat. 1884 (codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 5361 – 5367 (2006)).
196. 12 C.F.R. § 233.5(a) (2009). For a discussion of the UIGEA and the
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Even where the law might not impose such a direct duty,
Visa and MasterCard – brand owners themselves – have
incentives to protect the goodwill embodied by their
trademarks. To that end, both card associations impose duties
on their acquiring banks to restrict merchant activity. For
example, MasterCard prohibits “[i]llegal or [b]rand-damaging
transactions,” including “[t]he sale or offer of sale of a product
or service other than in full compliance with the law.”197
Likewise, Visa’s Operating Regulations prohibit use of the Visa
network for illegal activities which include, but are not limited
to, child pornography, money laundering or financing terrorist
activities.198 Though it presumably falls within each card
association’s definition of “illegal” transactions,199 the sale of
counterfeit goods is not explicitly mentioned in either card
association’s rules.
Despite the absence of an explicit prohibition on
merchants’ trafficking in counterfeit goods, both Visa and
MasterCard have policies in place that allow brand owners to
notify the card associations of websites that accept, or purport
to accept, their payment cards to purchase counterfeit goods.
So, rather than sue, brand owners can seek Visa and
MasterCard’s assistance in cutting off payment processing
services to websites selling counterfeit goods by submitting
reports of intellectual property infringement. For reports
submitted to Visa and MasterCard, brand owners must provide
a description of the alleged violation, provide their contact
information (and that of their agent, if applicable), identify the
system adopted by card networks to identify and block internet gambling
transactions, see Mark MacCarthy, What Payment Intermediaries Are Doing
About Online Liability and Why It Matters, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1037,
1062-66 (2010).
197. MASTERCARD WORLDWIDE, MASTERCARD RULES § 5.11.7 (Feb. 24,
2012), available at http://www.mastercard.com/us/merchant/pdf/BMEntire_Manual_public.pdf.
198. VISA, VISA INTERNAL OPERATING REGULATIONS 786 (Apr. 15, 2012),
available at http://usa.visa.com/download/merchants/visa-internationaloperating-regulations-main.pdf [hereinafter VISA OPERATING].
199. Sales of counterfeit goods have been identified as a source of income
for terrorist organizations. Counterfeit Goods are Linked to Terror Groups Business - International Herald Tribune, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/12/business/worldbusiness/12ihtfake.4569452.html.
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intellectual property that is allegedly infringed, and provide
the allegedly infringing merchant’s name, website, and
country, if available.200 On this last point – identifying the
merchant – it is sufficient to provide Visa and MasterCard with
the domain name of the infringing site, and the registrant’s
contact information contained in the Whois record for that
domain name. Of course, there must also be a basis for
believing that a reported website accepts the relevant type of
credit card, which can be satisfied by a screenshot or a
representation that the website claims to accept VISA or
MASTERCARD credit cards.
Upon receipt of a report of intellectual property
infringement, the card association will conduct a test
transaction for each identified website. This allows the card
association to verify that the website does in fact transact
business over its payment network, and to identify the
acquiring bank handling the merchant account. The card
association will then instruct the acquiring bank to investigate
the activities of the merchant associated with the website.201 In
the Visa and MasterCard networks, presuming the acquiring
bank determines that a violation has occurred and absent
“compelling” evidence to the contrary, the bank is expected to
terminate the merchant account,202 and enter the merchant’s
information into the MATCH system so that other acquiring
banks may be notified of the merchant’s past transgressions.203
200. Intellectual Property Rights, VISA INC.,
http://corporate.visa.com/about-visa/security-and-trust/intellectual-propertyrights.shtml (last visited Mar. 13, 2012) [hereinafter VISA IP].
201. See, e.g., id.; MasterCard Anti-Piracy Policy, MASTERCARD
WORLDWIDE, http://www.mastercard.com/us/wce/PDF/MasterCard_AntiPiracy_Policy.pdf [hereinafter MasterCard Anti-Piracy).
202. MasterCard Anti-Piracy, supra note 201.
203. MATCH stands for “Member Alert to Control High-Risk
(Merchants).” MASTERCARD WORLDWIDE, SECURITY RULES AND PROCEDURES:
MERCHANT EDITION 11-i (Feb. 24, 2012), available
at http://www.mastercard.com/us/merchant/pdf/SPMEEntire_Manual_public.pdfhttp://www.mastercard.com/us/merchant/pdf/SPME
-Entire_Manual_public.pdf. MATCH is a database containing information
about terminated merchants, including name, address and other identifiable
information. Under both the Visa and MasterCard systems, acquiring banks
are required to consult MATCH as part of their investigation into potential
merchants. Id. at 11-5http://www.mastercard.com/us/merchant/pdf/SPME-
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The results of the investigation (e.g., claiming that a merchant
account has been terminated) are then reported to the brand
owner who submitted the complaint.
In the absence of any legislation or case law that
unequivocally imposes on the card associations a duty to
monitor their payment networks to prevent counterfeit
transactions, the above-described policies may be considered
“voluntary.” However, one can reasonably presume that these
voluntary anti-counterfeiting policies are in part defensive,
aimed at staving off lawsuits and potential adverse judicial
decisions imposing secondary liability, and providing a basis
for card associations to argue to legislators that legislation
(such as that discussed in Part IV) is unnecessary.204 But
whatever the reason, or the degree of volition, card associations
presently appear willing to assist brand owners in combating
online infringement.
The recent evolution of the card associations’ policies
seems to support the view that they are a reaction to pending
legislation and/or the Frontline decision. In September 2009,
the International Trademark Association (INTA) released
“Addressing the Sale of Counterfeits on the Internet,” a
document setting forth voluntary best practices for brand
owners and “Payment Service Providers” (PSPs) in jointly
combating online counterfeit sales.205 In addition to providing
the PSP with information such as the infringing URL, and
proof of the brand owner’s intellectual property rights, these
best practices contemplated imposing on brand owners the
duty to complete a purchase from the alleged counterfeiter, and

Entire_Manual_public.pdfhttp://usa.visa.com/download/merchants/visainternational-operating-regulations-main.pdf, VISA OPERATING, supra note
198, at 852-54. Acquiring banks are required to input into MATCH
information regarding merchants who are terminated as a result of brand
owners’ intellectual property reports. See, e.g., MasterCard Anti-Piracy
Policy, supra note 201.
204. Yang, supra note 172, at 719.
205. INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARK ASSOCIATION, ADDRESSING THE SALE OF
COUNTERFEITS ON THE INTERNET (Sept. 2009), available at
http://www.inta.org/Advocacy/Documents/INTA%20Best%20Practices%20for
%20Addressing%20the%20Sale%20of%20Counterfeits%20on%20the%20Inter
net.pdf.
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to agree to indemnify206 the PSP for any liabilities incurred
from terminating services to a merchant based on the brand
owner’s complaint.207 Until recently, Visa required the brand
owner to make a purchase from the alleged infringer in order to
identify the acquiring bank. For its part, MasterCard required
the brand owner’s agreement to indemnify MasterCard, plus to
pay a per-URL fee. None of these requirements exist under
MasterCard or Visa’s current policies.208 To the extent that the
cost of conducting purchases, or reservations about providing
indemnity, dissuaded brand owners from working with the
card associations’ voluntary policies, these requirements are no
longer obstacles.
Card associations and payment processors have also
evinced a willingness to assist brand owners in other ways. For
example, Visa International, Visa Europe, MasterCard,
PayPal, and American Express have all signed on to participate
in the International Anticounterfeiting Coalition’s (IACC)
“payment processor portal.”209 The IACC “portal,” which
206. Among other things, the call for indemnification arises out of Visa’s
experience with the Russian website AllofMP3.com. Acting upon a complaint
that AllofMP3.com provided unauthorized downloads of copyrighted music to
consumers in whose jurisdictions such downloads were infringing, Visa
advised the Russian acquiring bank to terminate the Visa merchant account.
The merchant then sued the acquirer for breach of the merchant agreement,
Visa intervened in the suit on behalf of the acquirer, and a Russian court
decided in favor of the merchant, ordering that the bank and network
continue processing payments. This example of the application of sometimes
incongruous national laws to global transactions is one way that card
associations are exposed to potential liability in acting upon brand and
content owner’s infringement complaints. See Targeting Websites Dedicated
To Stealing American Intellectual Property: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 7-9 (2011) (statement of Denise Yee, Visa Inc.);
MacCarthy, supra note 196, at 1093-95.
207. Targeting Websites Dedicated To Stealing American Intellectual
Property: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 6 (2011)
(statement of Denise Yee, Visa Inc.).
208. MasterCard Anti-Piracy Policy, supra note 201; VISA IP, supra note
200. However, indemnity has not been totally abandoned, and may still be
required where, in investigating complaints of infringement, “undue risk will
be shifted to Visa were [Visa] to decide in favor of the intellectual property
owner.” Targeting Websites Dedicated To Stealing American Intellectual
Property: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 14
(2011) (statement of Denise Yee, Visa Inc.).
209. Int’l Anticounterfeiting Coal., Address at LVMH Tower Regarding
IACC Payment Processor Portal (Oct. 12, 2011).
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launched in early January 2012, is a web-based tool which
allows participating brand owners to submit a single report of
infringement to all participating payment processors.210 In
theory, the IACC portal should increase efficiency by obviating
the need for brand owners to submit a separate complaint to
each payment processor, and by reducing redundancies, such
as where a processor must act on multiple complaints from
different brand owners concerning the same URL.211 However,
unlike the card associations’ individual policies, use of the
IACC portal is not open to the public.212 The IACC assesses an
annual fee for access to the portal213 which, of course, must be
factored into brand owners’ cost-benefit analysis. Finally, the
third party retained to administer the IACC portal boasts
numerous financial institutions among its existing clients, and
brand owners contemplating using the IACC portal should
keep in mind this shared loyalty.214
2. Working with the Card Associations
On behalf of several brand owners, the authors of this
article have used the infringement reporting policies
implemented by Visa and MasterCard. This process has
produced mixed results. Visa and MasterCard have provided
timely responses to the reports, typically within two weeks
(though this timeframe may vary depending on the number of
websites identified in a report), resulting in the termination of
dozens of merchant accounts associated with counterfeiting
websites. And in no case has the associated acquiring bank
refused to terminate an identified merchant.
While the card association policies do result in the
termination of counterfeiters’ merchant accounts, these
represent a fairly small percentage of the overall number of
websites reported. This is because the majority of websites
reported do not actually process payments through the credit
card networks advertised on their sites, and are in that respect
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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“inactive.”215 That is, although the reported URLs resolve to a
functional website, complete with product listings, shopping
carts, and, of course, the card associations’ logos, it is often
impossible to complete a credit card transaction. This inactivity
takes two forms: (1) the website is inactive, in that a purchase
cannot be completed because the website is not working
properly, despite all appearances; or (2) the merchant is
inactive, such that, although a transaction may be authorized,
the transaction is not submitted by the merchant into the
payment system for clearing and settlement.216 Surprisingly,
an overwhelming majority of sites most highly ranked (i.e., on
the first few pages) in search engines’ organic results over a
period of 1-2 months have proven “inactive” upon investigation.
Though the high incidence of inactive websites was unexpected,
it was encouraging to learn that while such web sites may
attract consumers, these attractions cannot end in completed
sales of counterfeit product.
Of course, a finding of inactivity does not guarantee that a
website cannot resume actively accepting credit card payments
by obtaining a new account with a different acquiring bank.
And because there is no visible indication that activity has
resumed – the merchant does not flip on a neon sign to signal
that it is now “ACTIVE” – constant monitoring of the site is
required. Card associations have thus far been amenable to retesting sites previously deemed inactive, and our results seem
to show that, in most cases, sites deemed inactive have
remained inactive. Nevertheless, the constant vigilance
required to routinely monitor inactive sites and take action
against newly registered or discovered websites will lead to
ever-increasing watch lists for brand owners. To help alleviate
this burden, enforcement through card associations’ voluntary
policies should be coupled with enforcement efforts that result
in the websites being seized or otherwise made inaccessible to
215. As used throughout this section, the terms “active” and “inactive”
will refer to the ability and inability, respectively, to accept a credit card for
purchases.
216. In some instances, these sites may be phishing sites, designed
solely to misappropriate a consumer’s personal and credit card information. A
consumer may believe he is inputting his credit card information to make a
purchase, but instead has transmitted personal and financial information to
a criminal.
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consumers. The mass domain lawsuits discussed in Part II
provide a viable option for taking down counterfeiting sites on
a large scale, provided the joinder and jurisdictional questions
they raise can withstand the scrutiny of the courts, and
potential challenges by defendants. And to the extent that they
would allow brand owners to affect not only counterfeiters’
ability to process payments, but also the accessibility of
counterfeiters’ sites, legislation of the type described in Part IV
(putting aside the constitutional and other concerns raised by
opponents) might serve as an effective supplement to, or
replacement for, the card associations’ voluntary policies.
IV. Legislation Directed Towards Online Piracy and
Counterfeits
As brand owners attempt to deal with the problem of
online counterfeiting through the courts and through
cooperative efforts with credit card associations, lawmakers
have been crafting their own solution. Three recent bills in the
Senate and House of Representatives have attempted to
address online counterfeiting and piracy. The first, the
Combating Online Infringement and Counterfeits Act
(COICA),217 was introduced on September 20, 2010 by Senator
Patrick Leahy of Vermont, but was quickly stalled in the
Senate and expired at the close of the then-current
Congressional session. But Senator Leahy was not to be
deterred. The following session, Senator Leahy introduced the
successor to COICA, the Preventing Real Online Threats to
Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act of
2011, also known as the PROTECT IP Act, or PIPA.218
Meanwhile, Representative Lamar Smith of Texas introduced a
217. Combating Online Infringement and Counterfeits Act (COICA), S.
3804, 111th Cong. (2010) [hereinafter COICA I]. Roughly two months later,
Senator Leahy introduced an amended version of COICA. Combating Online
Infringement and Counterfeits Act, S. 3804, 111th Cong. (as amended by
Senate, Nov. 18, 2010) [hereinafter COICA II].
218. Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft
of Intellectual Property Act of 2011, S. 968, 112th Cong. (2011) [hereinafter
PIPA]. An amended version was reported 2 weeks later. Preventing Real
Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act
of 2011, S. 968, 112th Cong. (as amended by Senate, May 26, 2011).
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bill of his own – the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA)219 – in the
House of Representatives.
Though by no means identical, COICA, PIPA and SOPA
can be considered variations on a common theme, each at its
core proposing a framework allowing the Attorney General,
and, in the case of PIPA and SOPA, brand and copyright
owners, to combat online counterfeiting and piracy through
intermediaries whose services enable infringing websites to ply
their trade. Notwithstanding their differing terminologies, each
proposed to reach four key categories of intermediaries: (1)
search engines (e.g., Google and Yahoo!); (2) internet
advertising services (e.g., Google Adwords); (3) payment
processors (e.g., Visa and MasterCard); and (4) and internet
service providers (e.g., Verizon, Comcast). By exploiting
counterfeiters’ dependence on these intermediaries for survival,
the bills’ sponsors and supporters hoped to provide brand
owners with new, effective tools for combating online
counterfeiting.
A. Summary of the Bills
COICA, PIPA, and SOPA share a similar basic framework
for combating online infringement. Under each bill,
counterfeiting
websites
could
be
attacked
through
intermediaries – namely, third parties who provide various
services that enable infringing websites to thrive, and on a
more basic level, exist. This section will compare the three bills
topically, covering the domain names and websites potentially
affected; the bills’ varying definitions of “infringement”; the
third parties through whom plaintiffs would attack infringing
sites; the procedures to be employed; and the miscellaneous
provisions tacked onto each bill.

219. Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011) [hereinafter
SOPA I]. An amended version was introduced two months later. Amendment
in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 3261, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (as
amended by House, Dec. 12, 2011) [hereinafter SOPA II].
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1. Defining “Infringement”
Both COICA and PIPA were directed at sites “dedicated to
infringing activities.”220 COICA defined “dedicated to infringing
activities” in several ways. First, the term included sites
subject to civil forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 2323.221 Second, the
term included sites that were “primarily designed,” marketed,
or had no “demonstrable, commercially significant” purpose or
use other than to infringe copyrights, circumvent protection
mechanisms, or sell or distribute counterfeit goods.222
PIPA’s definition of “dedicated to infringing activities” did
not use civil forfeiture as a measuring stick,223 but is otherwise
substantially similar to the “primarily designed” prong of
COICA.224 However, the definition also included websites
which enable and facilitate such infringement,225 and, in this
respect, was likely adopted in lieu of a direct reference to the
civil forfeiture statute, which itself covers property used to
facilitate the commission of certain intellectual property
crimes.226
SOPA did not adopt the terminology used by COICA and
PIPA, instead setting its sights on two targets: “foreign
220. COICA I, supra note 217, § 2(a); PIPA, supra note 218, § 2(7);
COICA II, supra note 217, § 2(a)(1).
221. (a) Civil forfeiture.
(1) Property subject to forfeiture. The following property is
subject to forfeiture to the United States Government:
(A) Any article, the making or trafficking of which is,
prohibited under section 506 of title 17, or section 2318,
2319, 2319A, 2319B, or 2320, or chapter 90, of this title.
(B) Any property used, or intended to be used, in any
manner or part to commit or facilitate the commission of an
offense referred to in subparagraph (A).
(C) Any property constituting or derived from any proceeds
obtained directly or indirectly as a result of the commission
of an offense referred to in subparagraph (A).
18 U.S.C. § 2323(a) (West 2011).
222. COICA I, supra note 217, § 2(a).
223. PIPA, supra note 218, § 2(7).
224. Compare PIPA, supra note 218, § 2(7), with COICA I, supra note 217,

§ 2(A)(2)(a).
225. PIPA, supra note 218, § 2(7).
226. Id.
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infringing sites” (for purposes of the Attorney General) and
“sites dedicated to theft of U.S. property” (for purposes of
private plaintiffs). However, SOPA’s chosen terms had a
similar spirit and scope. “Foreign infringing sites” were defined
as those foreign sites directed to the United States, and which
would be subject to civil forfeiture if they were domestic
sites.227 SOPA’s definition of “sites dedicated to theft of U.S.
property” essentially mirrors that of PIPA, including the
engage/enable/facilitate triad.228 Thus, the three bills take
slightly different routes to reach the same destination,
targeting sites that committed infringements themselves, as
well as those that aided others commit infringements, whether
they did so with or without actual knowledge of the
infringement.
2. Actions Authorized and Domain Names Potentially
Affected
All three bills authorize the Attorney General to bring in
rem actions against domain names associated with infringing
websites.229 PIPA and SOPA also authorize the Attorney
General to bring in personam actions against the registrants or
operators of infringing sites.230 However, in personam actions
would likely be rare, given online counterfeiters’ proven track
record of concealing their true identities and locations, and the
strong likelihood that, in any event, they are located outside
the United States. Additionally, and in a much more significant
way, PIPA and SOPA expanded on COICA by creating a
private right of action allowing brand owners and content
owners to proceed in rem against certain domain names
associated with infringing websites.
COICA would have permitted the Attorney General to
commence an action against any domain name used in
connection with a “site dedicated to infringing activities.”231 In
227. SOPA I, supra note 219, §102(a).
228. Id. § 103(a)(1).
229. See COICA I, supra note 217, § 2(c)(1); PIPA, supra note 218, §

3(a)(2); SOPA I, supra note 219, § 102(b)(2).
230. PIPA, supra note 218, § 3(a)(1); SOPA I, supra note 219, § 102(b)(1).
231. COICA I, supra note 217, § 2(a)(1).
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its original and amended forms, COICA places no geographical
restrictions on the domain names subject to action.232 Thus,
COICA’s reach extended to domains administered and issued
by foreign domain name registries and registrars, as well their
counterparts residing in the United States.
PIPA circumscribed the Attorney General’s powers,
limiting actions to those against “nondomestic domain
names”233 – that is, domain names issued and operated by
registrars and registries outside the United States.234 However,
PIPA afforded brand owners the same reach that COICA
afforded the Attorney General: brand owners were authorized
to bring actions against all domain names, regardless of their
situs.235
SOPA took a similar bifurcated approach. The Attorney
General was authorized to act against “foreign infringing
sites,”236 which (in addition to being deemed infringing) had a
registrar, registry and IP address located outside the United
States.237 But, like PIPA, SOPA authorized brand owners to act
against a broader range of domain names (those associated
with sites “dedicated to theft of U.S. property”) regardless of
their situs.238 Though SOPA was amended to essentially limit
232. See COICA I, supra note 217, § 2(a) (where “domain name” is not a
defined term), and COICA II, supra note 217, § 2(a)(2) (adopting definition of
“domain name” from 15 U.S.C. § 1127). The Lanham Act defines a domain
name as “any alphanumeric designation which is registered with or assigned by
any domain name registrar, domain name registry, or other domain name
registration authority as part of an electronic address on the Internet.” (emphasis
added). Lanham Act, § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
233. PIPA, supra note 218, § 3(a).

234. PIPA, supra note 218, § 2(9). Of course the Attorney General would
still be able to act against domestic domain names under the civil forfeiture
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2323, which served as the basis for the Department of
Homeland Security Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) wave of
domain seizures beginning in June 2010.
235. PIPA, supra note 218, § 4(a); see also id. § 2(1) (incorporating
definition of “domain name” from 15 U.S.C. § 1127).
236. SOPA I, supra note 219, § 102(a).
237. See generally SOPA I, supra note 219; see also definitions of “foreign

infringing sites,” id. § 102(a), “foreign Internet site,” id. § 101(8), “domestic
Internet site,” id. § 101(5), “domestic domain name,” id. § 101(3) and “domestic
internet protocol address,” id. § 101(4). But again, the Attorney General’s
recourse to civil forfeiture proceedings against domestic domain names was
unaffected.
238. SOPA I, supra note 219, § 103(a).
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its reach to foreign sites, brand owners could still use SOPA to
reach domains associated with domestic registries and/or
registrars, as long as the owner of the site was located outside
the United States.239
3. Procedures
Upon commencing an action under COICA, the Attorney
General could seek relief authorized under Rule 65 of the
Federal Rules of Procedure, including a temporary restraining
order or preliminary injunction ordering the target to cease its
infringing activities.240 And upon receipt of an order, the
Attorney General could serve a copy on certain intermediaries
to compel them to take actions to restrict the website’s
functionality and accessibility. For example, in the case of
domestic domains, COICA provided that “[u]pon receipt of such
order, the domain registrar or domain name registry shall
suspend operation of, and may lock, the domain name.”241
Thus, service of a court order upon the relevant U.S.
registrar/registry could disable access to an entire website via
the targeted domain name.242
For “nondomestic” domain names, the Attorney General’s
options were different. COICA identified three types of
intermediaries that the Attorney General could serve with a
court order: (1) “service providers”; (2) “financial transaction
providers” (“FTPs”); and (3) “services that provide
advertisements to Internet sites” (“Ad Services”).243 Each group
was charged with a different set of duties to be performed upon
receipt of an order.

239. SOPA II, supra note 219, § 103(a)(1). For a definition of a “U.Sdirected site”, see id. § 101(23).
240. COIA II, supra note 217, § 2(b).
241. COICA II, supra note 217, § 2(e)(1).
242. STEVE CROCKER, ET AL., SECURITY AND OTHER TECHNICAL CONCERNS
RAISED BY THE DNS FILTERING REQUIREMENTS IN THE PROTECT IP BILL
(2011), available at
http://www.immagic.com/eLibrary/ARCHIVES/GENERAL/SHNKROUS/S110
525C.pdf.
243. COICA II, supra note 217, § 2(e)(2).
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COICA defined “service providers” broadly, incorporating
the meaning ascribed to that term in 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1),244
as well as encompassing “any other operator of a
nonauthoritative domain name system.”245 Upon receipt of an
order, a service provider (such as Comcast, Verizon, and other
ISPs) would be required to take “technically feasible and
reasonable steps designed to prevent a domain name from
resolving to that domain name’s Internet protocol address.”246
FTPs (such as Visa and MasterCard), defined with reference to
31 U.S.C. § 5362(4),247 would be required to take “reasonable
measures . . . designed to prevent or prohibit [their] services
from completing payment transactions” between the site and
U.S. customers.248 Finally, Ad Services that supplied
advertisements to the website were to cease doing so upon
receipt of the court order.249
244. (k) Definitions.
(1) Service provider.
(A) As used in subsection (a), the term "service provider"
means an entity offering the transmission, routing, or
providing of connections for digital online communications,
between or among points specified by a user, of material of
the user's choosing, without modification to the content of
the material as sent or received.
(B) As used in this section, other than subsection (a), the
term "service provider" means a provider of online services
or network access, or the operator of facilities therefor, and
includes an entity described in subparagraph (A).
17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1) (2010).
245. COICA I, supra note 217, § 2(e)(2). “Nonauthoritative domain name
system server” is not defined in the original or amended versions of COICA.
It is, however, defined in the Stop Online Piracy Act as “a server that does
not contain complete copies of domains but uses a cache file that is comprised
of previous domain name server lookups, for which the server has received an
authoritative response in the past.” SOPA I, supra note 219, § 101(19).
246. COICA II, supra note 217, § 2(e)(2)(B)(i).
247. 31 U.S.C. § 5362(4) (2006). (“(4) Financial transaction provider. The
term ‘financial transaction provider’ means a creditor, credit card issuer,
financial institution, operator of a terminal at which an electronic fund
transfer may be initiated, money transmitting business, or international,
national, regional, or local payment network utilized to effect a credit
transaction, electronic fund transfer, stored value product transaction, or
money transmitting service, or a participant in such network, or other
participant in a designated payment system.”).
248. COICA II, supra note 217, § 2(e)(2)(B)(ii).
249. COICA I, supra note 217, § 2(e)(2)(B)(iii).
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PIPA and SOPA operated in much the same way, but with
slight variations. For example, PIPA did away with COICA’s
expansive definition of “service provider.” In its place, PIPA
referred simply to “operators of a nonauthoritative domain
name system server” (“DNS Operators”).250 And in addition to
DNS Operators, FTPs, and Ad Services, all of which had
analogues under COICA, PIPA identified a fourth discrete
category of intermediaries on whom the Attorney General
might serve an order: “information location tools,”251 i.e., search
engines. Upon receipt of an order, information location tools
would be required to take reasonable measures to “(i) remove
or disable access to the Internet site associated with the
250. PIPA, supra note 218, § 3(d)(2)(A)(i).
251. PIPA, supra note 218, § 3(d)(2)(A). (the term “information location
tool” is a defined term); see also PIPA, supra note 218, § 2(4). PIPA draws
upon 17 U.S.C. § 512(d):
(d) Information location tools. A service provider shall not be
liable for monetary relief, or, except as provided in
subsection (j), for injunctive or other equitable relief, for
infringement of copyright by reason of the provider referring
or linking users to an online location containing infringing
material or infringing activity, by using information location
tools, including a directory, index, reference, pointer, or
hypertext link, if the service provider—
(1) (A) does not have actual knowledge that the material or
activity is infringing;
(B) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of
facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is
apparent; or
(C) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material;
(2) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable
to the infringing activity, in a case in which the service
provider has the right and ability to control such activity;
and
(3) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in
subsection (c)(3), responds expeditiously to remove, or
disable access to, the material that is claimed to be
infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity, except
that, for purposes of this paragraph, the information
described in subsection (c)(3)(A)(iii) shall be identification of
the reference or link, to material or activity claimed to be
infringing, that is to be removed or access to which is to be
disabled, and information reasonably sufficient to permit
the service provider to locate that reference or link.
17 U.S.C. § 512(d) (2010).
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domain name . . . or (ii) not serve a hypertext link to such
Internet site.”252 Thus, in addition to terminating a website’s
ability to process payments, depriving it of its advertisements
and associated revenue, and blocking DNS translation of the
associated domain name, the Attorney General could also
demand that a nondomestic domain be de-indexed from search
engine results. Private actors were limited to compelling action
by only FTPs and Ad Services.253
SOPA provided slightly different terminology and
definitions, but essentially affected the same types of
intermediaries.254 Far more notable was the “Market-Based
System to Protect U.S. Customers and Prevent U.S. Funding of
Sites Dedicated to Theft of U.S. Property” that appeared in the
original version of SOPA.255 This so-called market-based
system called for the creation of a DMCA-like notice/counter
notice framework to be used by brand owners prior to, and as a
prerequisite for, seeking a court order to compel action by FTPs
and Ad Services.256 A plaintiff would serve a “notification
regarding internet sites dedicated to theft of U.S. property”
upon the agent designated by the intermediary. The recipient
intermediary was required to notify the alleged infringer and
take “technically feasible and reasonable measures” within no
more than five days to suspend their services.257 FTPs were
tasked with preventing the infringing site from completing
payment transactions with consumers in the United States.258
Ad Services were to cease providing advertisements to or for
the infringing site, and cease providing or receiving ad revenue

252. PIPA, supra note 218, § 3 (d)(2)(D).
253. PIPA, supra note 218, § 4(d)(2).
254. For example, PIPA defined FTPs with reference to 31 U.S.C. §
5362(4). SOPA speaks of “payment network providers,” meaning those who
“directly or indirectly provide[] the proprietary services, infrastructure, and
software to effect or facilitate a debit, credit, or other payment transaction.”
SOPA II, supra note 219, § 101(20)(a). In addition, SOPA uses the term
“internet search engine” in place of PIPA’s “information location tool,” and
defines it differently. Compare SOPA II, supra note 219, § 101(15), with
PIPA, supra note 218, § 2(4), and 17 U.S.C. § 512(d) (2010).
255. SOPA I, supra note 219, § 103.
256. Id. § 103(b).
257. Id. § 103(b)(1)-(3).
258. Id. § 103(b)(1).
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derived from the infringing site.259 If the recipient intermediary
did not take appropriate action in response to the notice, or
resumed supplying services upon receipt of a counter-notice
from the alleged infringer, then the brand owner could
commence an action and obtain an order compelling the third
party to take action under the same framework set out in
COICA and PIPA.260
4. Safe Harbors
Each bill afforded immunities to the third-party services
providers compelled to take action against infringing sites.
COICA provided immunity to these various third-party service
providers for taking actions “reasonably designed to comply”
with an order.261 COICA also provided immunity in instances
where a third-party service provider voluntarily ceased
providing its services to a website it “reasonably believe[d]”
was dedicated to infringing activities.262 However, in the event
that a third-party service provider “knowingly and willfully”
failed to take appropriate action in response to an order, the
Attorney General was entitled to seek injunctive relief to
compel compliance.263 Likewise, Section 5 of PIPA provided
immunity to third-party service providers for voluntary actions
taken “in good faith and based on credible evidence” against
sites reasonably believed to be dedicated to infringing
activities.264 PIPA also extended that immunity to actions
taken against sites “engaged in infringing activities that
endanger the public health.”265 Similar safe harbors were
provided under SOPA.

259. Id. § 103(b)(2).
260. Id. § 103(c).
261. COICA II, supra note 217, § 2(e)(5)(A).
262. Id. § 2(e)(5)(B) (this subsection did not appear in the original bill,
COICA I).
263. Id. § 2(g)(1).
264. PIPA, supra note 218, § 5(a).
265. Id. § 5(b).
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5. Miscellaneous Provisions
In its original form, COICA contained a subsection (j)
which provided that the Attorney General would “maintain a
public listing of domains that, upon information and reasonable
belief, the Department of Justice determines are dedicated to
infringing activities but for which the Attorney General has not
filed an action under this section.”266 Service providers, FTPs,
and Ad Services were encouraged to voluntarily deny their
services to sites identified on the Attorney General’s list, and
offered similar safe harbors as applied to actions compelled by
order.267 Subsection (j) also set out procedures for website
owners/operators to petition the Attorney General to have their
sites removed from the list, and for judicial oversight of the
Attorney General’s decisions on such petitions.268 Not
surprisingly, Subsection (j) led opponents to dub COICA as an
“internet blacklist” bill.269 This provision did not appear in the
amended version of COICA.
For its part, SOPA also proposed a number of amendments
to Titles 17 and 18, as well as provisions for dealing with
“notorious foreign infringers,” and defending IP rights
abroad.270 Among the more controversial (and unrelated to
counterfeiting) was a provision tightening restrictions on online
streaming of copyrighted content.271 Opponents dubbed this the
“Free Bieber” provision, alluding to pop star Justin Bieber’s
rise to fame, which had its roots in his unauthorized YouTube
video performances of copyrighted musical compositions.272

266.
267.
268.
269.

COICA I, supra note 217, § 2(j).
COICA I, supra note 217, § 2(j)(2).
Id. § 2(j)(3)-(4).
David Segal & Aaron Swartz, Stop the Internet Blacklist,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 27, 2010, 9:40 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-segal/stop-the-internetblackli_b_739836.html.
270. SOPA II, supra note 219, §§ 201-205.
271. Id. § 201.
272. Amy Schatz, What Is SOPA Anyway? A Guide to Understanding the
Online Piracy Bill, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 18, 2012),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203735304577167261853938
938.html.
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B. Objections to the Proposed Legislation
The Senate Judiciary Committee unanimously approved
COICA on November 18, 2010.273 Eleven days later, Senator
Ron Wyden (D-OR) placed a hold on the legislation, writing
that COICA “attempts to protect intellectual property in the
digital arena in a way that could trample free speech and stifle
competition and important new innovations in the digital
economy.”274 With the Wyden hold in place, COICA died at the
close of the Congressional session. Senator Wyden similarly
placed a hold on PIPA in the Senate,275 and vowed to filibuster
PIPA if the hold were lifted.276 Senator Wyden wrote of PIPA,
I understand and agree with the goal of the
legislation, to protect intellectual property and
combat commerce in counterfeit goods, but I am
not willing to muzzle speech and stifle innovation
and economic growth to achieve this objective. At
the expense of legitimate commerce, PIPA’s
prescription takes an overreaching approach to
policing the Internet when a more balanced and
targeted approach would be more effective. The
collateral damage of this approach is speech,
innovation and the very integrity of the
Internet.277
Technology companies such as Google and Facebook, who
likely would be directly affected by passage of the bills, shared
273. Sam Gustin, Web Censorship Bill Sails Through Senate Committee,
WIRED.COM (Nov. 18, 2010, 2:50 PM),
http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2010/11/coica-web-censorship-bill/all/1.
274. Ron Wyden, U.S. Senator from Oregon, Statement by Senator Ron
Wyden Objecting to Unanimous Consent to Proceed to the Combating Online
Infringement and Counterfeits Act (Nov. 29, 2010), available at
http://wyden.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Statement%20on%20COICA%20hold.
pdf.
275. Press Release, U.S. Senator Ron Wyden, Wyden Places Hold on
Protect IP Act (May 26, 2011), available at
http://wyden.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/?id=33a39533-1b25-437bad1d-9039b44cde92.
276. David Kravets, Senator Threatens to Filibuster Internet Blacklisting
Bill, WIRED.COM (Nov. 21, 2011, 4:56 PM),
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/11/wyden-pipa-filibuster/.
277. Wyden Places Hold on Protect IP Act, supra note 275.
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Wyden’s opposition. In a letter to members of Congress
published in the New York Times in November 2011, Silicon
Valley rivals joined forces to voice concerns that PIPA and
SOPA created “uncertain liabilities,” required “monitoring of
websites,” threatened cybersecurity, and undermined the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).278
On January 14, 2012, the Obama Administration
announced its opposition to PIPA and SOPA: “[W]e will not
support legislation that reduces freedom of expression,
increases cybersecurity risk, or undermines the dynamic
innovative global internet.”279 The Obama administration
advocated for more narrowly tailored legislation, and
encouraged brand and content owners and service providers to
work cooperatively.280 Days later, on January 18, 2012,
thousands of websites, including Wikipedia and Mozilla, went
“dark” in a massive coordinated protest of PIPA and SOPA.281
The blackout of these websites was intended to provide
internet users with a “visceral example” of what website
operators feared might result (i.e., the forced shut down of their
website) should either bill be passed.282 The online protests
were accompanied by physical demonstrations in cities such as
New York, where protestors assembled outside of
Congressional offices.283

278. We Stand Together to Protect Innovation, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2011,
at A11.
279. Victoria Espinel, Aneesh Chopra & Howard Schmidt, Official White
House Response to Stop the E-PARASITE Act and 1 other petition: Combating
Online Piracy while Protecting an Open and Innovative Internet, WE THE
PEOPLE, https://wwws.whitehouse.gov/petition-tool/response/combatingonline-piracy-while-protecting-open-and-innovative-internet.
280. Id.
281. Zach Carter & Ryan Grim, SOPA Blackout Aims to Block Internet
Censorship Bill, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 18, 2012, 12:01 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/18/sopa-blackout-internetcensorship_n_1211905.html.
282. Jon Swartz & Scott Martin, Proposals Spur Website Protests, USA
TODAY, Jan. 18, 2012, at B1, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/MONEY/usaedition/2012-01-18-SOPAProtest_ST_U.htm (quoting Rob Berschizze, Managing Editor, Boing Boing).
283. Carter & Grim, supra note 281.
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Following the outpouring of opposition, both houses of
Congress delayed further action on the bills indefinitely.284 The
following sections will highlight some of the more prominent
objections underlying the protests, which remain relevant even
as the bills’ support in Congress waned, then vanished.
1. Creation of a Duty to Monitor
On any given day, sites such as YouTube provides access to
numerous videos that incorporate copyrighted materials
without authorization. While many are clearly fair uses, many
are clearly infringements. Likewise, a large number of items
sold or offered for sale on auction sites like eBay are
counterfeit. To date, YouTube, eBay, and many others have
avoided liability in the United States for their roles in
providing access to infringing content and counterfeit products,
because they contend that until notified of a specific instance of
infringement, they do not truly know whether a particular item
is infringing. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and
District Court for the Southern District of New York (among
others) have endorsed this theory, holding that “generalized
knowledge” that infringements may be occurring on an online
platform does not subject the operator to contributory liability
for trademark or copyright infringement.285 Opponents of PIPA
and SOPA argue that the proposed legislation would impose on
eBay and YouTube (and like platforms) a duty to monitor their
systems for infringing content and counterfeit products, or else
face termination of services and shuttering of their sites.286
Imposing such a duty runs counter to current contributory
liability case law, and, some argue, serves as an end-around to
the DMCA’s safe harbor provision.

284. Michael Macleod-Ball, SOPA and PIPA Votes Delayed Indefinitely,
ACLU (Jan. 20, 2012, 11:52 AM), http://www.aclu.org/blog/free-speechtechnology-and-liberty/sopa-and-pipa-votes-delayed-indefinitely.
285. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 109 (2d Cir. 2010)
(stating that allegations failed to provide sufficient knowledge under
Inwood); Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 525
(S.D.N.Y. 2010).
286. We Stand Together to Protect Innovation, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2011,
at A11.
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Under current law, when notified of specific instances of
infringement, eBay and YouTube take action to remove
infringing items to escape liability. YouTube, because it deals
in copyrighted content, relies on the provisions of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act.287 The DMCA provides a safe
harbor for hosts of websites that publish materials that
infringe a party’s copyright, provided that, upon notice from
the copyright owner, the content host promptly disables access
to the infringing materials.288 The DMCA has been interpreted
to mean that a host cannot be liable for its failure to act upon
general knowledge that its site may be offering infringing
material, so long as it doesn’t take an active role in the
infringing activity, and upon notice of actual infringing
material residing on its website, promptly disables the
infringing content.289 For this reason, despite the fact that it
knows its site is used by many to post infringing videos, a site
like YouTube cannot be held liable because upon notice of any
specific infringing video, it takes prompt measures to remove
the video.290
Although trademark law does not have an analogous
statutory safe harbor, similar common law principles apply.
Currently, contributory trademark infringement law does not
impose on service providers an affirmative duty to seek out
infringing content or products posted on the websites they
operate, or passing through their networks.291 For example, in
Tiffany v. eBay, the Second Circuit held that although eBay
was generally aware that its site was being used to sell
thousands of counterfeit Tiffany products, this did not support
a claim for contributory infringement against eBay.292 Because
eBay took prompt measures to remove specific items reported
to be infringing, but did not otherwise have “[c]ontemporary
knowledge of which particular listings [were] infringing,” eBay

287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
2008).
292.

17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006).
17 U.S.C. § 512(b)(2)(E) (2006).
Viacom, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 525.
Id. at 526.
Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 515 (S.D.N.Y.
Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 107 (2d Cir. 2010).
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was found to have satisfied its legal obligations.293 However, if
the evidence showed that eBay was “willfully blind” to the
infringement – that is, that it “intentionally shielded itself from
discovering the offending listings” – a contributory
infringement claim could lie.294
Opponents argue that PIPA and SOPA threaten to upset
the existing balances of the contributory liability doctrine and
the DMCA safe harbor provision, shifting the burden to police
infringing content from the intellectual property owner to the
website host. Thus, sites like YouTube and eBay would be
placed in the position of monitoring the vast and constantly
evolving bodies of user-generated content that appear on their
sites, and making unilateral determinations whether such
content might infringe the rights of known or unknown third
parties, lest they be shut down or deprived of funding.
However, supporters insist that the bills are directed toward
“foreign rogue websites,” and not intended to impose such
draconian
measures
against
legitimate
websites.295
Representative Lamar Smith, SOPA’s primary sponsor,
contends that blogs and social networking sites “have nothing
to worry about.”296 This is because “[w]ebsites like Facebook
and YouTube that host user content are not ‘primarily
dedicated to’ illegal activity” and do not market themselves as
such.297 Notwithstanding these assurances, sites like YouTube
and eBay may have legitimate cause for concern, as Mr. Smith
cannot guarantee that the Attorney General or brand and
content owners such as Tiffany and Viacom will agree.298
293. Id.
294. Id. at 109.
295. Edward Wyatt, Lines Drawn on Antipiracy Bills, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
14, 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/15/technology/linesare-drawn-on-legislation-against-internet-piracy.html?pagewanted=all.
296. U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, MYTH VS.
FACT: STOP ONLINE PIRACY ACT, available at
http://www.judiciary.house.gov/issues/Rogue%20Websites/011812_SOPA%20
Myth%20vs%20Fact.pdf (last visited March 19, 2012).
297. Id.
298. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 97 (2d Cir. 2010). For
example, in its suit against eBay, Tiffany claimed that its own investigations
revealed that 73.1% and 75.5% percent of TIFFANY merchandise purchased
through eBay in 2004 and 2005 was counterfeit. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay
Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (these studies were deemed
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2. Compromising the Security and Stability of the Internet
Some of the strongest opposition to PIPA and SOPA
pertains to the ability to manipulate the Domain Name System
(DNS). In simplest terms, the DNS is a like a telephone
directory for the Internet. Computers communicate with each
other using numerical IP addresses (for example the IP address
for Google.com is 207.151.159.3), which are difficult for humans
to remember.299 In order to make the Internet user-friendly,
DNS translates easy-to-remember domain names, such as
google.com, into the numerical IP Addresses that computers
use to identify locations on the Internet.300
As one way to combat online infringement, PIPA and
SOPA would allow the Attorney General to obtain an order
compelling service providers to block DNS translation of
domain names, severing the domain name from its associated
IP address. Some opponents argue that DNS filtering would
undermine the universality of domain names, “one of the key
enablers of the innovation, economic growth, and
improvements in communications and information access
unleashed by the global Internet.”301
In addition, DNS filtering is said to raise cybersecurity
concerns. Critics contend that the system proposed by PIPA
and SOPA, which would include redirecting users to different
resources (such as a message from the Department of Justice)
in response to a DNS request, is incompatible with DNS
Security Extensions (DNSSEC) measures designed to
authenticate DNS records.302 By interfering with, or inhibiting
DNSSEC authentication, PIPA and SOPA would potentially
threaten cybersecurity with respect to “distribution of malware
and other problematic Internet behavior . . . which could expose
personal information, credit card data, e-mails, documents,
stock data, and other sensitive information.”303 Further still,
opponents explain that DNS filtering and re-direction would
“methodologically flawed and of questionable value” by the trial court).
299. CROCKER ET AL, supra note 242, at 3.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 4.
302. Id. at 5.
303. Id.
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threaten security in the absence of a “mechanism to distinguish
court-ordered lookup failure from temporary system failure, or
even from failure caused by attackers or hostile networks.”304
Perhaps most compelling are arguments that the bills’
DNS filtering and re-direction approach is easily circumvented,
and therefore simply ineffective. First, the filtering will not
remove any infringing content from the targeted website, or
even disable the website. Filtering only severs the tie between
the domain name and the IP address where the website
resides. Thus, even if DNS filtering blocked translation of the
domain google.com, its content would still be accessible if
accessed directly by its (numerical) IP address. The websites
would
also
remain
accessible
through
non-filtered
nameservers.305 And of course, the infringing content can also
remain accessible through the DNS by the website owner
simply moving it to a new domain name.
Faced with strong concerns about the ramifications of
PIPA and SOPA on the security and stability of the DNS, the
filtering provisions were removed from the bills.306
3. Constitutional Concerns
The bills’ supporters have taken the position that the
“First Amendment is not an excuse for illegal activity.”307
Opponents, however, contend that PIPA and SOPA, by
potentially shuttering allegedly infringing websites on an ex
parte basis, without affording the owner an opportunity to be
heard, impose impermissible prior restraints on speech.308 To
avoid unnecessarily infringing critical First Amendment rights,
304. Id.
305. Id. at 7.
306. Jon Swartz & Scott Martin, Proposals Spur Website Protests, USA
TODAY (Jan. 17, 2012, 8:50 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/MONEY/usaedition/2012-01-18-SOPAProtest_ST_U.htm.
307. U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, supra note
296.
308. Letter from Mark A Lemley, David S. Levine, and David Post to
House of Representatives (Nov. 15, 2011), available at
https://www.cdt.org/files/pdfs/SOPA_House_letter_with_PROTECT_IP_letter
_FINAL.pdf.
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allegedly infringing websites should not be shuttered until
after a “prompt final judicial determination [on the legality of
the conduct] in an adversary hearing.”
To the extent that PIPA and SOPA draw upon civil
forfeiture procedure, their constitutionality is under collateral
attack in Puerto 80 Projects, S.L.U. v. United States.309 Puerto
80 arose out of the Department of Homeland Security
Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) wave of domain
name seizures dubbed “Operation in Our Sites 2.0.”310 ICE
obtained a seizure warrant for two of Puerto 80’s domain
names, rojadirecta.org and rojadirecta.com, which were
allegedly used to commit criminal copyright infringements,
namely, the streaming of copyrighted broadcasts of sporting
events.311 Puerto 80 challenged the seizure in the District
Court for the Southern District of New York and petitioned for
return of its domain names, contending that its sites merely
hosted message forums and indexed links to – but did not
directly host – the infringing content.312 Puerto 80 also claimed
that the seizure and suppression of its website violated its First
Amendment rights.313 The Court denied Puerto 80’s petition,
finding that the alleged First Amendment violations did not
constitute the “substantial hardship” required to release the
domains.314 Puerto 80 appealed to the Second Circuit, arguing
that the ex parte seizure of the domains constituted a prior

309. See Puerto 80 Projects, S.L.U. v. United States, No. 11-3390-cv,
2011 WL 6148823 (2d Cir. Dec 6, 2011).
310. Press Release, Department of Homeland Security Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, New York Investigators Seize 10 Websites That
Illegally Streamed Copyrighted Sporting and Pay-Per-View Events (Feb. 2,
2011), available at
http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1102/110202newyork.htm.
311. Id.
312. Petition for Release of Seized Property at ¶ 26, Puerto 80 Projects,
S.L.U. v. United States, 1:11-cv-3983-PAC (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 2011),
available at http://www.citmedialaw.org/sites/citmedialaw.org/files/2011-0613-Puerto%2080%20Petitionfor%20Release%20of%20Seized%20Property.pdf.
313. Id. ¶¶ 20-21.
314. Order Denying Release of Domain Names, at 4, Puerto 80 Projects,
S.L.U. v. United States, 1:11-cv-3983-PAC (S.D.N.Y. Aug.4, 2011), available
at http://www.citmedialaw.org/sites/citmedialaw.org/files/2011-08-04District%20Court%20Order.pdf.
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restraint on speech, rendering the seizures unconstitutional.315
As of the writing of this article, the Second Circuit has not yet
issued its decision, and rojadirecta.org and rojadirecta.com
continue to display ICE seizure notices more than a year
later.316
Opponents of PIPA and SOPA also point out that the bills
stand to affect the freedom of expression of individuals beyond
that of the infringer.317 For example, if a blogging site were
found to host an infringing post, the Attorney General could
conceivably have the entire site shut down, thus suppressing
an overwhelming and disproportionate amount of noninfringing speech. In addition to the problems of notice and
prior restraints symbolized by the Puerto 80 case, this type of
“collateral damage” to non-infringing speech is a serious cause
for concern among free-speech advocates.318
V. Conclusion
As the dust starts to settle after the flurry of activity
surrounding this legislation, we see that opponents to the bills
have passionately outlined the parade of horribles they fear
would follow should this legislation (in any of their drafted
forms) be approved. Interestingly, proponents of the bills agree
that the negative implications raised by the opponents would
be important to avoid. However, they argue that the parade of
horribles is outside the intent and goals of the bills and
unlikely to come to fruition.
For now, we put aside discussion of the merits of the
opposition to the proposed legislation. Instead, we consider the
impact the proposed legislation would have on the battle
315. Opening Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 2, Puerto 80 Projects,
S.L.U. v. United States, No. 11-3390 (2d Cir. Sept. 16, 2011), available at
http://www.citmedialaw.org/sites/citmedialaw.org/files/2011-09-16Puerto%2080%20Opening%20Brief.pdf.
316. See ROJADIRECTA, rojadirecta.org (last visited July 25, 2012);
ROJADIRECTA, rojadirecta.com (last visited July 25, 2012).
317. Laura W. Murphy & Michael W. Macleod-Ball, Stop Online Piracy
Act, in WRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE ACLU 2 (2011), available at
https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/Statement%20to%20HJC%20S
OPA%2011-16-11.pdf.
318. Id.
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against counterfeiters if the bills achieve what their supporters
argue is their intended purpose We conclude that passage of
any of these bills would serve as an endorsement of the efforts
that are discussed in this paper, and which are already
underway by brand owners, payment processors and the
federal government.319
In particular, passage of this legislation would send a
message to federal courts that permitting brand owners to
efficiently and cost-effectively resolve counterfeit disputes
involving large numbers of domains is consistent with the goals
set by Congress. Likewise, the district courts’ orders compelling
domain name registrars and payment processors to disable
websites and intercept funding for such sites, closely parallels
the statutory language of PIPA and SOPA that aim to
authorize such action. Moreover, passage of these bills would
not only endorse the (now) voluntary actions taken by credit
card processors, but would make them mandatory, immunizing
the processors for their efforts in assisting brand owners with
termination of counterfeit websites, and for policing use of their
own marks.
This naturally leads to the questions of: (1) whether the
tools available to brand owners that are discussed in this
article, namely mass domain lawsuits and assistance of
payment processors, which seemingly would be endorsed by
SOPA and PIPA, are sufficient to overcome the ever-crippling
problem of online counterfeit websites; and (2) given that these
tools already exist, whether the passage of SOPA and/or PIPA
would have any impact on the effectiveness of these tools. The
answer: we don’t know – yet.
In the end, it almost certainly comes down to the numbers.
For brand owners to prevail, they need to reach a level of
efficiency whereby they can manipulate these tools (and
perhaps other tools) to create enough of a disruption – in terms
319. A federal government seizure of the popular filing sharing website
megaupload.com, and the arrest of four of its owners earlier this year,
prompted many to question whether legislation such as SOPA and PIPA are
truly necessary. The seizure of megaupload.com highlighted the powers
already vested in the federal government to combat online piracy. See
Andrew Couts, MegaUpload Shut Down by Feds: Why Do We Need SOPA?,
YAHOO! NEWS (Jan. 19, 2012), http://news.yahoo.com/megaupload-shut-downfeds-why-sopa-225952735.html.
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of sheer number of terminated websites, disabled merchant
accounts and frozen financial assets – that it no longer remains
profitable for a website owner to continue creating and
optimizing new sites, registering new domains, and
establishing new merchant accounts. Or at minimum, so that
the counterfeit website owner is persuaded to simply direct its
counterfeit activity towards some other less aggressive brand
owner’s property.
To date, this threshold has not been reached, by even the
most actively-enforcing brand owners. Until this balance is
tipped in brand owners’ favor, whether by SOPA, PIPA or
otherwise, there will be insufficient incentive for the
counterfeit website owners to refrain from their present
scheme of avoiding eradication through volume and anonymity.
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